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Present tax laws provide an added stimulus for the traditional
benevolence which has brought minors into an economic ownership
of wealth. It has become increasingly important for estate planners
to consider all family members, adults and minors, present and
future, and their estates, to achieve a maximum enjoyment of
property for the entire family.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the available planning
methods under Nebraska law for dealing with the vexatious prob-
lems which arise from ownership of wealth by minors. This includes
a consideration of the nature and extent of a minor's disability
to deal with his own property; a comparison under Nebraska law
of guardianships, trusts and custodianships; and some fairly clear
recommendations which can be made to define the relative estate
planning roles of outright gifts, with or without guardianships,
trusts and custodianships.
I.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A MINOR'S DISABILITY
TO DEAL WITH PROPERTY.
A. MINORITY DEFINED.
For most purposes in connection with property management
and estate planning, the terms "minor" and "infant" include "all
persons under twenty-one years of age - . . but in case a female
marries under the age of twenty-one years her minority ends."' This
is the definition contained in the guardianship statutes.
It is not clear how broadly this definition is meant to apply
1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-101 (Reissue 1960).
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throughout Nebraska law. The statute has been construed to mean
that a married female is "of lawful age" to convey real property.2
A bequest to be accumulated in trust for beneficiaries "until they
shall reach their majority" was held to be payable to a female
beneficiary married under the age of twenty-one. 3 And the Court
has referred to this definition with respect to the term "minor
child" under the adoption statutes.4
Recent legislation, however, has tended to specify an age. The
custodianship statutes define a minor as any person who has not
attained twenty-one years.5 The liquor control act and juvenile
court statutes7 now employ specified ages which have eliminated
former ambiguities.
To the extent that undefined usage of the term "minor"
remains in the Nebraska statutes,8 it would seem that a female
would lose her minority when she marries. A policy argument
exists that a married female should retain her majority status upon
the death of her spouse or divorce from him, or even after an
annullment, although the questions have never been passed upon
by the Supreme Court.9 Otherwise, third persons would be required
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-211 (Reissue 1958); Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429,
27 N.W. 393 (1886).
3 Rotzin v. Miller, 133 Neb. 4, 274 N.W. 190 (1937).
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-101 (Reissue 1960); In re Petition of Ritchie, 155
Neb. 824, 827, 53 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1952).
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001 (11) (Reissue 1960).
6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-103(21) (Supp. 1961). Previously, the Attorney
General had ruled that the statute prohibiting procuring alcoholic
liquors "to or for any minor" contemplated a twenty-one year age re-
quirement. Op. ATTY GEN., Jan. 29, 1944. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 53-145,
53-180 to .02 (Reissue 1960). For a discussion of a lower court decision
reaching an apparently opposite conclusion, see Note, The Effect of
Marriage on the Legal Status of a Female Under Twenty-one Years of
Age in Nebraska, 31 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1952). And the Revisor of Statutes
had included a cross reference to the guardianship definition of minor.
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201 (Supp. 1961). For the previous use of the term
"minor," see NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201 (1943).
8 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-230 (Supp. 1961) (divorce jurisdiction of
separate juvenile court), 71-2508 (Reissue 1958) (sale of poison to "any
minor under eighteen years of age"). For a consideration of the require-
ment that a testator be "of full age," see text at notes 41-43 infra.
9 Cf. 3 WHITFORD, NEBRASKA PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 1293 (1957):
"It would seem that having once attained her majority she could not thus
lose it but there are no Nebraska cases on the point. If the marriage
were annulled then presumably in contemplation of law she had never
reached majority." But see Note, The Effect of Marriage on Minority in
Iowa, 41 IOWA L. REV. 436, 438-439 (1956).
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to deal with a married female under age twenty-one at their own
peril as to her possible marital deficiencies.
B. CONTRACTS.
(1) The General Rules of Voidability.
Nebraska follows the rule that minors' contracts are voidable
transactions.'0 According to the black letter of the general law, this
means that the agreement is valid and enforceable, but may be
avoided at the option of the minor, or probably by his guardian,
administrator or heirs."' But the agreement cannot be avoided by
the other contractual party on this ground, or by creditors.12
This power of avoidance may be exercised against an assignee
or a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under present
law13 and under the Uniform Commercial Code.'4 Under both the
Uniform Sales Act 15 and Uniform Commercial Code, 6 however,
the power of avoidance may not be asserted against a bona fide
purchaser for value of a chattel.
The transaction may be avoided during minority or within a
10 E.g., Smith v. Wade, 169 Neb. 710, 100 N.W.2d 770 (1960); Star v.
Watkins, 78 Neb. 610, 111 N.W. 363 (1907); Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb.
195, 58 N.W. 852 (1894); Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610, 49 N.W. 371
(1891); Nations v. Gregg, 290 Fed. 157 (8th Cir. 1923).
11 See note 10 supra; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 23-24 (3d ed. 1959).
12 2 WLisooN, CONTRACTS 23-25 (3d ed. 1959).
13 Id. at 25-26. But see BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
435-36, 754-55 (7th ed. 1948).
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305, comment 4: 'Paragraph (a) of sub-
section (2) is new. It follows the decisions under the original Act in
providing that the defense of infancy may be asserted against a holder
in due course, even though its effect is to render the instrument voidable
but not void. The policy is one of protection of the infant against those
who take advantage of him, even at the expense of occasional loss to
an innocent purchaser. No attempt is made to state when infancy is
available as a defense or the conditions under which it may be asserted.
In some jurisdictions it is held that an infant cannot rescind the trans-
action or set up the defense unless he restores the holder to his former
position, which in the case of a holder in due course is normally im-
possible. In other states an infant who has misrepresented his age may
be estopped to assert his infancy [see Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342,
185 N.W. 1000 (1921)]. Such questions are left to the local law, as an
integral part of the policy of each state as to the protection of infants."
15 NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-424 (Reissue 1958). See 2 WILLISTON, SALEs 349-50
(Rev. ed. 1948).
16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403.
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reasonable time after becoming of age,'7 whether it is executory or
executed.'8
An infant may ratify the contract upon reaching majority. 19
In fact, if he uses, sells or retains the goods previously received
during infancy,20 or does not act to disaffirm within a reasonable
time of becoming of age,2 1 he may be deemed to have ratified the
agreement. Ratification is a mixed question of law and fact and
turns upon the circumstances in the individual case.
22
(2) Exceptions to the General Rules.
There are a number of exceptions and qualifications to the
general rules of voidability in Nebraska:
(a) Necessaries. A minor is liable for the reasonable value of
17 E.g., Smith v. Wade, 169 Neb. 710, 100 N.W.2d 770 (1960); Star v. Watkins,
78 Neb. 610, 111 N.W. 363 (1907); Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58
N.W. 852 (1894); Bloomer v. Nolan, 36 Neb. 51, 53 N.W. 1039 (1893);
Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610, 49 N.W. 371 (1891); Nations v. Gregg,
290 Fed. 157 (8th Cir. 1923).
is In the case of an executed or partially executed contract the infant, to
disaffirm, need return only so much of the consideration as he then has
in his possession. See, e.g., Star v. Watkins, 78 Neb. 610, 111 N.W. 363
(1907); Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N.W. 852 (1894); Bloomer v.
Nolan, 36 Neb. 51, 53 N.W. 1039 (1893). See generally 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS 35-43 (3d ed. 1959).
19 E.g., Klapka v. Shranger, 135 Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938); Philpot v.
Sandwich Mfg. Co., 18 Neb. 54, 24 N.W. 428 (1885).
20 First Nat'l Bank v. Guenther, 125 Neb. 807, 252 N.W. 395 (1934) (use
of property amounted to affirmance); Krbel v. Krbel, 84 Neb. 160, 120
N.W. 935 (1909) (retaining benefits while taking no action to disaffirm);
Uecker v. Koehn, 21 Neb. 559, 32 N.W. 583 (1887) (could not affirm part
of transaction which was beneficial and repudiate that which imposed
obligation). But see Brownell v. Adams, 121 Neb. 304, 236 N.W. 750
(1931) (infant stockholder relieved of statutory liability since stock
worthless and, consequently, he received no benefit); Bloomer v. Nolan,
36 Neb. 51, 53 N.W. 1039 (1893) (ratification of mechanic's lien cannot
be implied from retaining the property and collecting the rents from
it). See generally 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 45-46 (3d ed. 1959).
21 O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347, 30 N.W. 274 (1886) (conveyance by minor
sought to be disaffirmed thirteen years after reaching majority; held,
not within reasonable time). But see Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195,
58 N.W. 852 (1894) (two months after reaching majority was reasonable
time to disaffirm conveyance); Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610, 49 N.W.
371 (1891) (disaffirmance of promissory note eighteen months after
reaching majority held to be within a reasonable time).
22 Brownell v. Adams, 121 Neb. 304, 236 N.W. 750 (1931); Englebert v.
Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N.W. 852 (1894).
ESTATE PLANNING FOR MINORS
necessaries contracted for and received, by case law,23 under the
Uniform Sales Act,24 and under the Uniform Commercial Code.
25
(b) Misrepresentation of Age. The general rule is that in an
action at law on the contract, although not in equity, a minor is
not precluded from asserting the defense of infancy even though
he has misrepresented his age.26 Nebraska, however, has held a
minor liable on a contract, relying on the theory of estoppel in pais,
where the misrepresentation was fraudulently made and has been
relied upon by the other party.
2 7
(c) Statutes. By statute, a minor can deal with life, health,
or accident insurance or annuity contracts if he is fourteen years
of age or over,28 accounts in building and loan and savings and
loan associations, 29 United States government bonds purchased by
23 See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 49-52 (3d ed. 1959); cf. Cobbey v. Buchanan,
48 Neb. 391, 67 N.W. 176 (1896) (lawyer's investigation as to title and
interest infant had in deceased father's estate is not necessary; nor
were the services rendered in habeas corpus proceeding); Englebert v.
Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N.W. 852 (1894) (lawyer's services in foreclosure
suit not considered as necessaries).
24 NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-402 (Reissue 1958).
25 UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 1-103.
26 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 64 (3d ed. 1959).
27 Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921); Cobbey v.
Buchanan, 48 Neb. 391, 67 N.W. 176 (1896). The UNnomv COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-103 by rephrasing sections 2 and 73 of the UNIFORM SALES ACT
and expressly adding the word "estoppel" appears to incorporate this
case law.
28 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-705 (Reissue 1960).
29 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-318(1) (Reissue 1962): "Shares of stock in any
association, or in any federal savings and loan association incorporated
under the provisions of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, with its
principal office and place of business in this state, may be subscribed for,
held, transferred, surrendered, withdrawn, and forfeited, and payments
thereon received and receipted for by any minor in the same manner and
with the same binding effect as though such person were of full age,
except that the said minor or his estate, shall not be bound on his sub-
scription to stock except to the extent of payments actually made
thereon." Although the formal language is in terms of "shares of stock,"
the statute apparently covers all of the types of accounts presently em-
ployed by building and loan and savings and loan associations in Ne-
braska. Prior to its amendment in 1955, this statute applied only to
minors over fourteen years of age. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-318 (Reissue 1954).
In 1959, the legislature repealed a similar provision, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 8-161 (Reissue 1954), dealing with savings banks, apparently because
there were no savings banks in Nebraska. There are no similar statutory
provisions in Nebraska applying to commercial banks, notwithstanding
a general practice by these banks to accept savings deposits from minors
and open checking accounts for minors. Some states have granted ex-
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him, 30 and veterans loans or insurance with the United States gov-
ernment.3'
C. GIFTs.
The capacity of a minor to dispose of his property by gift is
subject to the same limitations as an attempted contractual obliga-
tion of a minor. The transfer of property by gift is voidable at the
tensive statutory privileges to minors in the banking law and cor-
responding protection to those who deal with them. See, e.g., N. Y.
BANKING LAW § 134(1); cf. N. Y. BANKING LAW §§ 239(1), 171(1), 310
(2), 394(3). Although no Nebraska cases have been found on the point,
it may be that commercial banks are subjecting themselves to a risk of
liability in opening savings accounts and checking accounts for minors
in Nebraska. Analytically, if the establishment of the account is based
upon a contract, the contract would be voidable by the minor whether or
not it is still executory. The minor would need to return only so much
of the consideration as he still possesses. And as a matter of statutory
construction, a negative inference unfavorable to commercial banks may
be drawn from the existence of section 8-318 and the absence of any
corresponding provision for commercial banks. See also NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 38-121 (Reissue 1960). The case of a minor withdrawing funds from a
savings or checking account may be different from the case of a minor
writing checks payable to third persons. Even though in both cases a
debtor-creditor relationship is established, the return of funds to the
minor might be comparable to a bailee returning bailment property to a
minor bailor. On the other hand, the checking account payment to a
third party may be analagous to that of a loan of money to a minor for
a purchase from a third person. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 243 (3d ed.
1959); Ellis v. Ellis, 3 Salk 197, 91 Eng. Rep. 774 (1795): "An infant is
chargeable for money lent, if it is laid out for necessaries, according to his
degree; but all that is at the peril of the lender." See also Rowe v. Grif-
fiths, 57 Neb. 488, 495, 78 N.W. 20, 22 (1899): "If this was an action for
the recovery of the money paid, we can imagine that it might be proper
for Mr. Creighton to allege and show that the money had been used in
the purchase of necessaries, and that under such circumstances a court
might refuse to recognize the defense of infancy." In view of the uncer-
tainty of a commercial bank's liability in these matters, banks should be
given statutory protection in the areas in which public policy of present
times makes it desirable to extend banking privileges to minors.
30 Treas. Reg. 31, § 315.51 (1957) (reprinted in Treas. Dep't Cir. No. 530):
"If the owner of a savings bond is a minor and the form of registration
does not indicate that there is a representative of his estate, payment will
be made to him upon his request, provided that he is of sufficient com-
petency to sign his name to the request for payment and to understand
the nature of the transaction. In general, the fact that the request for
payment has been signed by a minor and duly certified will be accepted
as sufficient proof of competency and understanding." For the condi-
tions on which payment may be made to a parent or other persons on
behalf of a minor, see Treas. Reg. 31, § 315.52 (1957).
31 NEB. REV. STAT. § 80-701 (Reissue 1958).
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option of the infant or his personal representative.3 2 The rationale
behind these holdings is simply that if the law deems voidable
the contracts of a minor so as to protect him from his improvident
acts, then a fortiori the gifts of a minor would also be avoidable. 33
This concept of voidability, as in the case of contracts, is supple-
mented by rules concerning ratification, disaffirmance, and avoid-
ance.34 Though there are no Nebraska cases on this subject, it should
be assumed for planning purposes that the court would consider the
gift of a minor to be voidable.
There is, however, some authority that an infant's gift is
absolutely void.3 5 The concept upon which these decisions are
based seems to be an early common law distinction that if the
infant's contract was to his benefit he was bound, if it was to his
prejudice the contract was void, and if the beneficial or prejudicial
nature was uncertain then the contract was voidable . 3  On this
basis, a gift was considered manifestly and necessarily prejudicial
and thus void.37 The great weight of authority, however, is that
a gift by a minor is merely voidable.
For federal tax purposes, the voidable nature of a minor's pur-
ported gifts would preclude the imposition of a gift tax during the
period of voidability38 and the property would remain a part of his
federal estate tax gross estate.39 The same property also might be
includable in the estate of the donee if the donee predeceases the
minor, although the valuation might be reduced because of the
power of avoidance.40
32 See, e.g., Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647 (1865) (apparently the leading case
on voidability of gifts); Slaughter v. Cunningham, 24 Ala. 260 (1854);
Johnson v. Alden, 15 La. Ann. 505 (1860); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185,
181 Atl. 689 (Ch. 1935); Murray v. McKenzie, 23 Ont. L. Rep. 287 (1911).
33 See Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647, 649 (1865).
34 See Person v. Chase, 37 Vt. 647 (1865); Murray v. McKenzie, 23 Ont. L.
Rep. 287 (1911).
35 Gillmett v. Tourcott, 213 Mich. 617, 182 N.W. 128 (1921); cf. Oxley v.
Tyron, 25 Iowa 95 (1868) (result turned on other facts).
36 Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102 (1868); Gillmett v. Tourcott, 213 Mich. 617,
182 N.W. 128 (1921); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3 (3d ed. 1959).
37 Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102 (1868); Gillmett v. Tourcott, 213 Mich.
617, 182 N.W. 128 (1921).
38 Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied 309 U.S.
680 (1940) (gift complete upon attaining majority without disaffirmance).
39 This result could be reached under either INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033
(power to avoid treated as substantial ownership) or INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2038 (power to revoke). LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE &
GIFT TAXES 51 (2d ed. 1962).
40 Id. at 52.
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D. WILLS.
The wills statutes permit a testamentary disposition of real and
personal property by "every person of full age.""41 The statutes
do not specify whether the term "full age" contemplates the common
law requirement of twenty-one years or is modified by the general
guardianship language defining majority that "in case a female
marries under the age of twenty-one years her minority ends. '42
It seems probable that a married female under twenty-one can
execute a valid will in Nebraska.4 3
E. TRUSTS.
A minor has capacity to establish a trust of his property only
to the extent that he could transfer the property by outright gift.
44
This means that a trust created by a minor is valid, but may be
avoided by the minor, his guardian, his heirs, or his personal rep-
resentative.43 An infant can serve as trustee of a trust created by
an adult, but his powers of administration are no broader than if
he owned the trust property outright.
"
F. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT.
There is little American authority dealing with the capacity
of a minor to exercise or release a power of appointment.47 Some
41 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-201, 30-202 (Reissue 1956).
42 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-101 (Reissue 1960).
43 See 1 PAGE, WILLS 582 (Bowe-Parker Rev. 1960): "In many statutes
persons of 'full age' can make wills and testaments. What full age is de-
pends upon the law of each state with reference to the age of majority;
and this rule is thus adopted by the Wills Act."; 1 WHITFORD, NEBRASKA
PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 100 (1954); Bordwell, The Statute Law of
Wills, 14 IowA L. REV. 172, 177-179 (1929). For concise discussion of the
policy reasons, see Note, The Effect of Marriage on Minority in Iowa, 41
IOWA L. REV. 436, 437-438 (1956). This reasoning could also allow a
married female under twenty-one to do other acts dependent upon ar-
riving at "full age," such as serving as an executrix. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-308 (Reissue 1956).
44 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS 176-79 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 18 (1959): "A person has capacity to create a trust by declaring himself
trustee of property to the extent that he has capacity to transfer the
property inter vivos."
45 See notes 10-12 supra.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 91 (1959).
47 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345, caveat (1940): "As to such capacity of
infants and insane persons there is neither sufficient authority nor suf-
ficiently clear analogy to justify restatement."
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state statutes4 and the opinions of most of the writers,49 however,
take the position that a minor cannot exercise a power of appoint-
ment to a greater extent than he could make an indefeasible
transfer of the property subject to the power. In a strict property
sense, the exercise of a power of appointment is an event upon
which a defeasible title shifts and not an independent transfer by
the donee of the power.5 0 Arguably, under the "relation-back"
doctrine the minor donee of the power is merely carrying out the
intention and capacity of the donor of the power, and, like the
minor agent for a competent principal,51 can act under the authority
of the donor of the power.52 On balance, the same considerations
which generally limit a minor's ability to make contracts and
gifts will probably prevail to prevent his exercise of a power of
appointment, general or special. It is possible that a guardian may
be able to exercise a general power of appointment presently
48 See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 573 n.3 (Casner ed. 1962).
49 Id. at 572-574; SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 971 at
420-422 (2d ed. 1956); SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 201 (1951); 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 35 (3d ed. 1939); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 363 (1952).
50 See SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 911-912 at 370-375
(2d ed. 1956).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 21, comment a (1958). But a minor's
contracts through a competent agent are, like the minor's own contracts,
held to be voidable. Id. § 20, comment c.
52 A preliminary answer to this argument may be that, in most cases, the
intent of the donor is not to create a power exercisable by an incompe-
tent donee. See SIMES & SMrIT, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 971 at
419 (2d ed. 1956): "If the donor, in creating the power, merely states
that it is exercisable by deed or by will, it is a reasonable inference that
he means a deed or will executed by a person having the capacity to
execute such an instrument as a conveyance or devise of property.";
5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 573 (Casner ed. 1952): "If the matter
is approached as a question of the presumed intent of the donor of the
power, the same conclusion is reached. Surely a donor who has placed a
dispositive creation in a donee is not likely to have intended that the
act of the donee should be effective even if the donee, at the time of the
act, was incapable of exercising reasonable judgment." The issue un-
answered by the case law is whether a minor can exercise a power of
appointment where the donor has expressly stated that the requirement
of age has been waived. It is at this point that the public policy under-
lying the protection of minors should declare the provision invalid as
being against public policy (even a public policy which would permit
a married female to be of age at eighteen, but a married male only at
twenty-one). However, the question would still remain whether the
provision is wholly invalid or only partially invalid so as to permit an
exercise by someone on the minor's behalf, or by the minor himself
if he can demonstrate a personal reasonable judgment.
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exercisable in favor of the minor.53 But the guardian would not
appear to have authority to exercise the general power in favor of
others unless given this power under the governing instrument,54
since the guardian could not make a gift of the minor's property.55
Whether or not a guardian can exercise a special power of appoint-
ment for the minor is likely to depend wholly upon a determination
of the intention of the donor of the power as to its exercisability,5
Nevertheless, there may be important federal tax consequences
from a general power of appointment possessed by a minor donee.
The Commissioner has taken the position that property subject
to a general power is includable in the federal estate tax gross estate
even though the beneficiary is at all times incompetent to exercise
the power.57 In some situations, a gift to a minor may qualify for
the gift tax present interest exclusion if the minor has a general
power of appointment over the property, even though the transac-
tion would otherwise be a gift of a future interest, and even though
the general power of appointment is not exercisable under local
property law.5 8 Similarly, a minor beneficiary could be taxable
on trust income subject to his formal power to vest income or
53 See Jacques v. Swallow, 77 R.I. 517, 78 A.2d 4 (1951); Jones v. Clyman,
193 Iowa 1248, 188 N.W. 954 (1922).
54 See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 363 (1952): "It would seem that a general
power might well be so exercisable by the guardian or committee to
produce funds needed for the ward's support, although other representa-
tive exercises of a general power and all representative exercises of
special powers could well be denied."
5 In addition to the lack of statutory authorization for a guardian to make
gifts (or, specifically, to exercise a power of appointment), see, e.g.,
In re Hall's Guardianship, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947); In re Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 268 N.Y. 494, 273 N.Y.S. 158 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd
271 N.Y. 537, 2 N.E.2d 368 (1934); In re Tillman, 137 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1956).
5G There is no clear-cut policy or case law on this issue. If the minor could
exercise the special power upon becoming of legal age, it might be con-
tended that a guardian would be making a gift of the minor's property
by eliminating the minor's personal ability to exercise the power. If the
power is exercisable only during minority (e.g., if the minor dies during
minority as he shall appoint by a special power of appointment), both
the policy of the law and the donor's presumed intent might favor exer-
cise by the legal guardian appointed to act in the interests of the minor,
rather than a gift in default of appointment (assuming, of course, that
any exercise of a power of appointment is within a guardian's powers
with respect to the minor's property).
57 Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 384. See note 282 infra.
58 See discussion, notes 280-284 infra.
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principal in himself, although the minor cannot personally exercise
the power.59
G. PARTNERSHIPS.
The income tax law now makes clear that a minor can be a
partner for income tax purposes to the extent that capital is a
material income-producing factor.60 The desire to split income
among all family members has brought some infants into the family
business within a few moments of birth.0 '
Ordinary contract rules apply to partnership situations. This
means that the partnership agreement is valid and enforceable,
except that it is personally voidable by the minor.62 There is a
split of authority whether the infant partner is automatically en-
titled to a return of his contribution upon repudiation. 3 The
majority view apparently is that the adult partners have a lien
on the infant's contribution to the extent of creditors' unpaid claims
and partnership losses. 4
An infant partner has the same rights and powers as any other
partner, plus his personal right of avoidance. Since a minor can
act as agent for an adult principal, 5 a contract entered into by him
in the partnership name is binding upon the partnership, the adult
partners, and the third party.6 Only the personal liability of the
59 Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 678; Trust No. 3 v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d
102 (7th Cir. 1961); note 281 infra.
00 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(e).
61 This was especially true prior to the 1948 amendments permitting joint
income tax returns by spouses. See, e.g., Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120
F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1941) (son made partner in accounting firm on day of
birth); Charles Redd, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 528 (1946) (partners were
husband, wife, and four children aged seven, five, two and three months,
but wife reportedly testified she was "too busy producing partners" to
participate in the management of the partnership).
62 CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS 39 (2d ed. 1952); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 17 (3d ed.
1959).
63 See Kuipers v. Thome, 182 Ill. App. 28 (1913) (may rescind agreement
and recover the sum advanced); Thomas v. Banks, 224 Mich. 488, 195
N.W. 94 (1923) (could recover amount paid, less amount received from
the partnership). Contra, Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. 664 (1887)(could disaffirm partnership contract and avoid personal liability, but
could not recover the money paid in unless he was induced to enter into
the partnership by fraudulent misrepresentations).
64 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 18 (3d ed. 1959); CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 40 (2d ed.
1952).
05 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 21, comment a (1959).
66 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 17 (3d ed. 1959).
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infant on any partnership contract, whether made by himself or
another partner, is subject to his right of avoidance.67
H. JOINT OWNERSHIP.
A minor can become the owner of a joint interest in property
to the same extent he can own property outright. The problems
arise not in the ownership of property, but in its management or
disposition by either the minor or the other joint tenant. For
example, where a husband and wife, both under twenty-one, execu-
ted a mortgage on homestead real estate, and where the husband
repudiated his obligations thereunder, the entire mortgage was
held invalid.68 The husband could avoid the mortgage and the
related notes on the basis of his infancy. The mortgage itself was
also invalid as to the wife because of the statutory requirement
that both spouses must execute a conveyance of a homestead inter-
est.6 9 If the mortgage had not been invalid as to the wife, it would
have operated as a severance of the joint tenancy into a tenancy
in common.70 This would not only have defeated the intention of
the owners as to survivorship rights, but, on the facts involved,
quite likely have brought about a partition suit and guardianship
proceedings.
In addition, Nebraska has a rule that a survivorship bank ac-
count may not be entirely withdrawn by one joint tenant without
the knowledge and consent of the other.71 A minor joint tenant
is probably as incapable of consenting to a withdrawal of an excess
proportion of the funds as he would be of making an outright gift
of the property.
The creation of a joint tenancy with a minor, then, seems very
unwise. It not only risks a vesting of the entire interest outright
in a minor incapable of dealing with it, but may substantially tie
up the effective use of the property during the lifetime of the adult
joint tenant until the minor becomes of age.
67 Kuehl v. Means, 206 Iowa 539, 218 N.W. 907 (1928) (infant partner could
not repudiate partnership contract, but only personal liability); Latrobe
v. Dietrich, 114 Md. 8, 78 Atl. 983 (1910); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 17-18
(3d ed. 1959); CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 39 (2d ed. 1952); cf. Klinck v. Reeder,
107 Neb. 342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921) (infant partner not allowed to set up
defense because of misrepresentation of age).
08 Smith v. Wade, 169 Neb. 710, 100 N.W.2d 770 (1960).
69 NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-104 (Reissue 1960).
70 See, e.g., Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954).
71 Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953); cf. Whiteside v.
Whiteside, 159 Neb. 362, 369-70, 67 N.W.2d 141, 146 (1954).
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II.
A COMPARISON OF LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GUARDIAN-
SHIPS, CUSTODIANSHIPS AND TRUSTS.
There are three schemes for management of the property of
minors under Nebraska law. Guardianships and custodianships are
provided for by the statutes. Trusts, of course, are systems for the
management of property in accordance with the governing trust
instrument.
There are a large number of significant differences in the legal
consequences of these arrangements.7 2 Perhaps the most important
factor from an estate planner's point of view is that the operative
consequences of guardianships and custodianships are spelled out
by statutory provisions which the planner is virtually powerless
to vary, whereas he has a comparatively free hand in designing
the scope and operation of trusts. An analysis of the legal implica-
tions of guardianships, custodianships and trusts indicates that
important objectives can be achieved from each in some situations,
but that where substantial amounts of property are involved, the
use of a trust will normally have overwhelming advantages.
The "guardian" contemplated in these comparisons is the
statutory guardian having a duty of care and management of the
property of the minor. Although parents are natural guardians
of their minor children 7 3 a natural guardian does not have authority
as such to deal with the property or estate of minors.7 4 The role
of a natural guardian pertains to custody of the person of the minor
and responsibility for education. The statutory guardianship pro-
visions do not limit the powers and obligations of courts to appoint
guardians ad litem to protect the interests of minors in specific
litigation.75
72 The comparisons in this article originated in part from material pre-
pared by Flavel A. Wright, What Every Lawyer Should Know About
Trusts, 16TH ANN. INST. ON FEDERAL TAx LAW mNm ESTATE PLANNING 19,
24-26 (Neb. State Bar Ass'n 1958).
73 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-107 (Reissue 1960).
74 Wells v. Steckleberg, 50 Neb. 670, 70 N.W. 242 (1897); see cases collected
in Annot., 6 A.L.R. 115 (1920).
75 NEB. RE V. STAT. §§ 38-114 (Reissue 1960), 24-615, 25-309, 25-310, 26-130,
26-131, 27-202 (Reissue 1956); Cass v. Pense, 155 Neb. 792, 54 N.W.2d 68
(1952); Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 95 N.W.2d 186 (1959). See
Peterson v. Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 481-482, 113 N.W.2d 628, 637 (1962): "An
action by an infant must be brought by his guardian or next friend, who
alone is liable for costs. The infant is not liable to a judgment for costs.
... By statute, one who as next friend brings an unsuccessful suit on
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A "custodian" is a person so designated under the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act or the related statutes permitting bequests to minors.76
The authority for this device is derived from these statutes which
were enacted to facilitate the making of gifts of securities to minors.
It might be best to regard the custodianship as purely a statutory
creature, free from the general rules or analogies of trusts, guardian-
ships, agency, bailments, or other traditional legal categories. The
statute contains a considerable conceptual ambiguity, however, by
stating that "a custodian has and holds as powers in trust, with
respect to the custodial property, in addition to all rights and powers
provided in sections 38-1001 to 38-1010, all the rights and powers
which a guardian has with respect to property not held as custodial
property."77 From this, it may be difficult in areas where the
statutory framework for custodianships is unclear to infer whether
the legislature intended to create a wholly independent group of
rules for custodianships or to employ some portions of either trust
or guardianship law.
A word of caution should also be injected about what might in
lawyerlike language be called "informal management devices,"
but to the layman sometimes means "do it yourself estate planning."
behalf of an infant is chargeable with the costs. Section 25-308, R.R.S.
1943. ... The defense of an infant must be by a guardian for the suit, who
may be appointed by the court in which the action is prosecuted. Section
25-309, R.R.S. 1943. It is the duty of an attorney to act as the guardian
of an infant defendant in any suit pending against him when appointed
by the court to do so. He is entitled to such compensation for such serv-
ice as the court shall deem reasonable .... The courts of this state are
authorized by statute to tax as costs a reasonable fee for the services
of a guardian ad litem. The litigant to whom the fee for services of a
a guardian ad litem shall be taxed as costs depends upon the circum-
stances of each particular case and the discretion of the court .... An
attorney acting under appointment as a guardian ad litem must look
only to the court for the amount of his compensation, to be taxed as a
part of the costs of the proceedings and collected as such."
76 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001(6) (Reissue 1960). For a preliminary con-
sideration of the custodianship statutes, see Note, The Nebraska Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, 40 NEB. L. REV. 466 (1961). Apart from this statute,
there is no clear-cut meaning of the terms "custodian" or "custodian-
ship," although they are generally employed as an undefined usage of
the concept of a "stakeholder."
,7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(9) (Reissue 1960). These problems are not
made any less difficult by the fact that the guardian can be named cus-
todian. In fact, if the named custodian is not eligible, renounces or dies,
the guardian automatically becomes custodian. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 38-1007(4) (Reissue 1960). But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1003(1) (Re-
issue 1960), note 130 infra. Although the draftsmen appear to have been
primarily concerned with overcoming the existing limitations on making
effective gifts to minors for tax purposes, the statute does appear in-
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These devices are usually arrangements by which the donor intends
to make a gift to the minor to take effect only upon the donor's
death, with a right to revoke the gift anytime prior to death. In
a lawyer's hands, the results from the well-known executed but un-
delivered (or ambiguously delivered) deeds, joint safe deposit
boxes, and similar equivocal transactions, can quite easily be
achieved effectively by either a will or revocable trust.
These "informal management devices" have been fertile sources
of litigation both from the factual issues of donative intent, delivery
and acceptance, and from the resulting legal consequences in vari-
ous circumstances of attempted revocation by the donor, heirs of
the donor challenging the donee's rights, the donee or his heirs
attempting to enforce rights against the donor or his heirs, creditors
of either the donor or donee claiming rights in the property, or
taxing authorities imposing income, gift, estate or inheritance taxes
upon either the donor or donee. Even though the donor may not
have chosen to label or define his transaction initially, the law
will characterize the arrangement in terms of the existing nomen-
clature in the ensuing litigation. Unfortunately, "informal man-
agement devices" are not as uncommon as they are legally in-
effective.
It also seems that joint ownership of property with a minor is
not a reasonably available alternative to the property management
devices in this section. The creation of the joirit tenancy is in many
forms the legal equivalent of an outright gift.7 8 Inheritance by the
minor would involve all of the disadvantages of outright owner-
ship at the time of inheritance by the minor. Not only does the
device involve possible uncertainty concerning the rights of the
minor in the property and its proceeds, but also it does not remove
the property from the donor's taxable estate or eliminate the neces-
sity for some court proceedings on the death of any joint tenant.
A. SUBJECT MATTER.
The subject matter of a guardianship covers all property of
the minor in the State of Nebraska.79 Separate guardianships are
required for property located in other states, unless the law of the
foreign state permits the Nebraska guardian to deal with the
property.
tended to define the entire consequences of the statutory custodianship as
a legal arrangement.
78 See notes 68-71 supra.
79 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-505, 38-109, 38-110(1) (Reissue 1960).
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A trust may normally contain any type of property regardless
of jurisdictional location. Insofar as general trust law is concerned,
a Nebraska trustee can hold property in other states.80 A foreign
individual, but not a foreign corporation,8' can serve as a trustee
of a Nebraska trust.8 2 A Nebraska corporate trustee may not be
qualified or permitted by certain foreign states to act as a fidu-
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 94 (1959).
81 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-201 (Reissue 1962). Also, a foreign corporation can-
not hold title to Nebraska real estate. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-402 (Reissue
1958).
82 The Nebraska statutory provisions with respect to residence of a fidu-
ciary are unclear. An administrator is required to be a Nebraska resi-
dent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-315 (Reissue 1956). In addition, nonresidence
is specifically a ground for a court's removal of an administrator. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-324 (Reissue 1956). Nonresidence is also a ground for
removal of an executor. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-310 (Reissue 1956). The
statute on appointment of an executor provides, however, that "the
county court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named executor therein, if he is legally competent, and he shall accept
the trust and give bond as required by law." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-302
(Reissue 1956). There is authority that this section requires the initial
appointment of an otherwise qualified nonresident executor, even though
the nonresidence might constitute grounds for his subsequent removal.
In re Estate of Haeffele, 145 Neb. 809, 18 N.W.2d 228 (1945), overruling
In re Estate of Cachelin, 124 Neb. 556, 247 N.W. 422 (1933); Janzen v.
Goos, 302 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1962): "Legal competency under this
statute, although it was once held otherwise . . . apparently does not
include Nebraska residence."; Stubbs, Probate Procedures Available To
Beneficiaries, 39 NEB. L. REV. 311, 316 (1960). But a forceful argument
can be made that the probate court can refuse at the outset to appoint a
named nonresident executor. Spencer, Practical Legal Problems, 26 NEB.
L. REV. 226, 232-233 (1947): "On two different occasions I have refused
to appoint a nonresident of Nebraska as the executor of a will. There
has been some criticism of this practice but I believe I am right. Section
30-302 provides that the court shall appoint the person named executor,
if he is legally competent. It is true that Section 30-302 lays down no
residence requirement. However, Section 30-310 provides that a court
may remove an executor if, among other reasons, he shall reside out of
this state. If, therefore, a court may remove an executor because he
resides out of the state, certainly the court should have the right to refuse
to appoint a non-resident in the first instance. . . . [I]n that case
[In re Estate of Haeffele], the point involved was the fact that the execu-
tor might eventually have a conflict of interest and the court suggested
that courts should not anticipate improper conduct. I suggest that
this case can be distinguished because, at the instant of his appointment,
a non-resident is subject to removal under Section 30-310." The testa-
mentary trustee provision seems to infer that the named trustee will be
formally appointed by the court if competent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1801
(Supp. 1961). The testamentary guardian sections create the same
inference. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-112, 38-507 (Reissue 1960). There is no
statutory requirement that a statutory guardian be a Nebraska resident.
The statutes do provide, however, that a testamentary trustee, statutory
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ciary.83 Some local practice in this regard has been for corporate
trust officers to serve as individual trustees to the extent the cor-
poration is precluded from acting in another state, 4 although this
practice is specifically prohibited by some foreign states.8 5 Other
states forbid the appointment of any nonresident trustee, give the
court discretion to refuse the appointment of a nonresident trustee,
broaden the normal jurisdiction of the court in situations involving
nonresident trustees, require the appointment of a resident agent
for the service of process upon nonresidents, or impose other con-
ditions upon the appointment of a nonresident as a trustee.8 6
The duties of a guardian with respect to the minor's property
guardian or testamentary guardian may be removed if evidently unsuited
to carry out his duties. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1805 (Reissue 1956), 38-507
(Reissue 1960). An equity court would have inherent authority to re-
move an inter vivos trustee if the trustee cannot properly carry out the
trust. From this, it would seem that a nonresident would not be dis-
qualified merely because of his nonresidence from serving as a testa-
mentary trustee, statutory guardian, testamentary guardian or inter
vivos trustee. But it might still be possible for a court to take the
position that the fact of nonresidence renders the person unsuitable to
properly perform his duties, either at the time of an initial appointment
or later in a removal proceeding.
83 For a survey of these practices, see Note, Right of a Non-Resident to
Qualify and Serve in Fiduciary Capacities-An Analysis, 37 VA. L. REV.
1119 (1951).
84 This practice has apparently been carried on nationally for a good num-
ber of years. Id. at 1133, quoting from Stephenson, Rights of Out-of-
State Trust Institutions, 16 STUDIES IN TRUST BusINEss, 2d SERIES 342
(1944): " 'As soon as the states began to close their doors to out-of-state
trust institutions, the draftsmen of wills began to have their clients name
individuals connected with out-of-state trust institutions. Sometimes
these individuals were designated, not by name, but by office. For ex-
ample, the will read, 'I name as executor of my will the person who shall
be the officer in charge of the trust department of the X Trust Company
at the time of my death and his successor or successors in office.' Doubt-
less it was understood by both the draftsman and the testator that the
trust company would serve as agent for the head of its trust department,
that it would assume the responsibility, do the work, receive the allow-
ance, and, to all intents and purposes, be the executors.' "
85 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1701 (1949) ("No officer, employee or
agent of such bank or corporation shall be permitted to act as a fiduciary
in this state, whether such officer, employee or agent is a resident or
nonresident of this state, when in fact such officer, employee or agent is
acting as such fiduciary on behalf of such bank or corporation"), 59-1702("Every fiduciary, before entering upon the duties of his trust, shall take
and subscribe to an oath ... that he is acting on his own behalf and not
on behalf of any bank or corporation organized and having its principal
place of business outside this state.").
86 See 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 94 (2d ed. 1956).
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are more extensive than a trustee's. A guardian may act on personal
items due to or from the minor and has authority to represent the
minor in legal proceedings. 87 Where neither parent is living and
competent, a guardian has duties beyond those of managing the
minor's property, such as personal custody and care for the educa-
tion of the minor,88 and consenting to adoption 9 or marriage. 90
It may be necessary to have a statutory guardian appointed to
perform the duties growing out of custody of the person or litigation
even in a thoroughly planned estate. A surviving parent may make
this appointment by will.91 If the best interests of the minor and
his property would be served, the county court can appoint separate
guardians of the property and of the person of the minor.92 This
is required if a trust company is named guardian of the property.93
The gifts to minors statutes only authorize contributions of
money and securities to the custodianship. 94 The investment powers
of a custodian may be broad enough to permit other forms of
property to be obtained by reinvestment of the original fund of
money and securities.9 5 The duties and authority of a custodian




If the minor is a Nebraska resident, only the county court of
the county in which the minor resides can appoint a guardian for
87 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-502 (Reissue 1960), 25-307 (Reissue 1956).
88 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-108 (Reissue 1960).
89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-105(3) (Reissue 1960).
90 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-105(4) (Reissue 1960).
91 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-112 (Reissue 1960); note 111 infra.
92 State v. Young, 121 Neb. 619, 237 N.W. 677 (1931).
93 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-206(5) (Supp. 1961) (permitting a corporate trust
company to act "as guardian, of the property of any infant").
94 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1002(1), 38-1101 (Reissue 1960). A number of states
have amended the statute to include life insurance and life insurance
proceeds.
95 See notes 341 and 342 infra.
96 The literal language of the statute might even permit a custodian to act
as a guardian of the person of the minor. The term "guardian" is de-
fined in the custodianship statute to include a guardian of the estate
or person. NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001(7) (Reissue 1960). And a custodian
is given all the rights and powers of a guardian. NEB. REV. STAT. §
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the minor and his property in Nebraska.97 The residence of a minor
is determined by that of his parents or other person having legal
custody of the child.98 If the minor is not a Nebraska resident, a
foreign guardian may, upon a proper showing, be entitled to posses-
sion of all personal property in Nebraska and to conduct litigation
in Nebraska without the appointment of a Nebraska guardiany
A foreign guardian may be authorized to sell Nebraska real estate
for the payment of debts of the ward and the charges of managing
his estate. 00 Otherwise, a Nebraska guardianship would be needed
for real property owned by a nonresident minor.'0
The selection of a guardian lies in the discretion of the county
court to act for the best interest of the minor. The court may appoint
38-1004(9). This could include guardianship of the person of the minor.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-108 (Reissue 1960). But, so far, there has been no
suggestion that the statute be this broadly construed. This construction
might conflict with NEB. CONST. art. V, § 16.
97 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-102 (Reissue 1960): "The county court in each
county, when it shall appear necessary or convenient, may appoint
guardians to minors and others, being inhabitants or residents in the
same county, and also to such as shall reside without the state, and have
an estate within the same." In re Guardianship of Peterson, 119 Neb.
511, 229 N.W. 885 (1930); In re Connor, 93 Neb. 118, 139 N.W. 834 (1913).
Once guardianship jurisdiction attaches, it continues even though the
minor may move to another county. See Olsen v. Marsh, 142 Neb. 800,
810, 8 N.W.2d 169, 174 (1943) (quoting from a Maine decision): "'Such
minor cannot acquire a residence in another county from that in which
the guardian was appointed that will oust the judge of probate who
appointed such guardian, of jurisdiction over the minor and his estate,
and the appointment of a new guardian by the judge of probate in
another county, while the first guardianship continues, is void.'"
98 Application of Walker, 172 Neb. 398, 109 N.W.2d 724 (1961); In re
Guardianship of Peterson, 119 Neb. 511, 229 N.W. 885 (1930); In re
Connor, 93 Neb. 118, 139 N.W. 834 (1913).
99 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-801 (Reissue 1960). The foreign guardian must
reside in the same state or territory as his ward; he must post a security
bond double the value of the ward's property; the removal of the
property must not be prejudicial to the interests of the ward; all
Nebraska creditors of the ward must be fully paid or full payment
tendered; and the foreign jurisdiction must have enacted a similar
provision for recovery and possession of property by nonresident
guardians for their nonresident wards.
100 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-621 (Supp. 1961).
101 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-513, 38-514 (Reissue 1960).
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any "suitable person,'1 0 2 charitable corporation, 0 3 trust company, 04
or humane society. 0 5 In addition, the Juvenile Court Act contains a
reference to guardianship of the person of a neglected, dependent
or delinquent child by the association or individual to whose care
the child is committed by the juvenile court. 06
There is apparently no residence requirement for an individual
guardian.10 7 Also, there is no order of priority as to persons entitled
to the appointment, 08 although the court has held that it is in the
best interests of the minor to appoint a parent who has had custody
of the minor for a number of years and is otherwise competent and
suitable.0 9
A minor, fourteen years old or over, is entitled to nominate his
own guardian, "and ordinarily the county court should approve
the person so nominated unless, in the exercise of its discretion it
comes to the conclusion that the person nominated is disqualified to
act as such."1' 0 A surviving parent may by will appoint a testamen-
102 In re Guardianship of Lyon, 140 Neb. 159, 163, 299 N.W. 322, 324 (1941):
"No statute of Nebraska, aside from one relating to the appointment
of a guardian for one receiving payment from the United States Veter-
ans' Bureau ... seems to place any restriction upon what person shall
act as a guardian of a minor or incompetent person, other than to pro-
vide that a 'suitable person' shall be so appointed."
103 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-103 (Reissue 1960) ("any charitable corporation
organized under the laws of this state, and now or hereafter authorized
by its articles to undertake the care and management of minor children").
104 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-206(5) (Supp. 1961) (guardian of the property only).
105 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-118 (Reissue 1960).
106 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-209 (Supp. 1961). The potential constitutional con-
flicts of jurisdiction between the juvenile courts and county and district
courts in guardianship matters have not yet arisen in the reported
decisions.
107 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-102 (Reissue 1960); In re Guardianship of
Lyon, 140 Neb. 159, 299 N.W. 322 (1941). For a comparison of the resi-
dence requirements for Nebraska fiduciaries, see note 82 supra.
108 See In re Guardianship of Lyon, 140 Neb. 159, 162, 299 N.W. 322, 324
(1941): "No statute of Nebraska is cited that gives preference to any
person, spouse, or next of kin of the ward, in the appointment of a
guardian, as is the case in the appointment of an administrator of a
person deceased." But cf. Workman v. Workman, 171 Neb. 554, 561, 106
N.W.2d 722, 726 (1960): "If one having a legal right to the appoint-
ment of guardian, such as a parent, is a fit and proper person to act
in that capacity, he should not ordirarily be denied such right."
109 Workman v. Workman, 171 Neb. 554, 106 N.W.2d 722 (1960).
110 Id. (syllabus by the court); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-102 (Reissue 1960); see
Bradley v. Bradley, 126 Neb. 52, 252 N.W. 469 (1934).
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tary guardian, with the same powers and duties as a statutory
guardian."i
The matters of resignation or removal of guardians and ap-
pointment of successors are also carried out in the county court."
2
The county court can seek the removal of a guardian, or take other
actions concerning the guardianship, on its own motion.
1 3
(2) Trustee.
The selection, removal and resignation of trustees, and appoint-
ment of successor trustees, are normally controlled by directions in
the trust instrument in the case of living trusts." 4 Even in the case
,of testamentary trusts, the directions in the will govern, but the
county court has authority to approve a voluntary resignation"15
and to remove a trustee (or possibly to refuse a decedent's nomina-
tion of a trustee or successor trustee).110 These matters, however,
11 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-112, 38-113 (Reissue 1960). The appointment is
probably not conclusive on the county court, but, like the executor
named under a will, effective unless the guardian is found to be in-
competent or "otherwise unsuitable." See NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-302
(Reissue 1956). The "appointment" of a testamentary guardian by a
surviving parent may be entitled to a greater persuasive effect than a
"nomination" by a minor fourteen or over, since the testamentary
guardian statute does not contain the language "if approved by the
court," and, in fact, seems specifically to distinguish "a guardian ap-
pointed by the court." Note, too, that the word "appoint" (by the court)
is employed in section 38-104, the minor's provision, in contrast to the
word "nominate" (by the minor). Only the term "appointment" appears
in the testamentary guardian provisions. And see NEB. REv. STAT. §
38-507 (Reissue 1960) ("appointed either by the testator or county
court").
112 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-507 (Reissue 1960).
13 See Workman v. Workman, 168 Neb. 408, 413, 95 N.W.2d 704, 708 (1959)
("of controlling importance is that the duty to protect a minor in a
guardianship proceeding devolves upon the court on notice to the
guardian and not necessarily upon some other person having a rela-
tionship to the proceeding or the estate"); Robertson v. Epperson, 78
Neb. 279, 110 N.W. 540 (1907); Crooker v. Smith, 47 Neb. 102, 66 N.W.
19 (1896).
114 Absent a provision in the trust instrument, these matters must be
judicially determined, but the consent of all beneficiaries may permit
the resignation of a trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRuSTS §§
106-108 (1959).
115 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1804 (Reissue 1956).
116 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1805 (Reissue 1956). Section 30-1801 can be read
literally as precluding the county court from failing to appoint the named
trustee, and section 30-1803 can be read as leaving the matters of per-
petuating the trust solely to the trust instrument if there are provisions
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are primarily in the control of the settlor and his draftsman. Com-
pared with the rules for guardianships and custodianships, trusts
offer wide latitude for planned control of these important items in
the establishment and administration of the arrangement.
(3) Custodian.
A custodianship is created by a gift11 7 or bequest1 1 8 of securities
or money with a designation that it is made under the Nebraska
Uniform Gifts To Minors Act. The gift can be made to only one
minor, and only one person may be custodian.1 9 The initial designa-
tion of a custodian is made by the donor. The statutes do not state
that a trustee may be permitted under a gift or bequest to distribute
from the trust to a custodian for the minor, but such a device could
have estate planning uses.1
20
For a security in registered form,'121 or money,'122 the custodian
may be any adult, including the donor, a guardian of the minor, or
a trust company. The donor cannot be custodian of securities not in
registered form. 23 From a tax standpoint, the donor should not be
selected as custodian. 2 4
A resigning custodian may designate his successor by an instru-
ment in writing, reregistration of the securities, and delivery of all
custodial property to the successor. 25 The resignation and designa-
in the instrument. Read as a whole, it would appear that the express
power of the county court to remove "any trustee . . . who shall be
evidently unsuitable to perform his duties as such trustee" would permit
the court to refuse at the outset to designate such a person as trustee or
successor trustee. See note 82 supra.
17 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002 (Reissue 1960). But failure to transfer posses-
sion and control to the custodian, erroneous designation of a custodian,
or renunciation by the custodian, will not invalidate the gift.
I's NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 38-1101, 38-1102 (Reissue 1960).
119 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002 (2) (Reissue 1960).
120 For an illustration of the usefulness of such an arrangement, see text
at note 271 infra. Also, the Nebraska statutes do not specifically provide
that insurance proceeds can be made payable to a custodian.
121 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002(1) (a) (Reissue 1960).
122 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002(1) (C) (Reissue 1960).
123 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002(1) (b) (Reissue 1960).
124 See note 263 infra. Tax factors may be more important in selecting a
custodian than a trustee, since in some situations a trustee can be im-
munized by draftsmanship from powers which could have adverse tax
consequences.
125 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1007 (2) (Reissue 1960).
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tion of a successor could also be handled through the county court.1 26
Only an adult member of the minor's family (i.e., parents, grandpar-
ents, brothers, sisters, uncles and aunts' 27), a guardian of the minor,
or a trust company can become successor custodian.2 8
Where the named custodian is not eligible, renounces or dies,
the guardian of the minor becomes successor custodian, or if there
is no guardian, the county court designates a successor. 29 A guardian
can exercise all of the powers of a custodian with respect to the
custodial property free from county court supervision of the guard-
ianship. 30 In the case of a bequest, the executor can name a cus-
todian with the approval of the county court if the named custodian
does not act.13 '
C. BoND.
Guardians are required to furnish bonds in the amount fixed
by the county court. 32 Testamentary guardians 33 and testamentary
trustees 34 may serve without bond if permitted by the will, unless
the court finds a "sufficient" reason to require a bond. Absent any
provision in the trust instrument, trustees of inter vivos trusts need
126 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1007(3) to (6) (Reissue 1960).
127 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001(10) (Reissue 1960).
128 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1007(1) (Reissue 1960).
129 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1007(4) (Reissue 1960).
130 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1003(1) (Reissue 1960): "[N]o guardian of the
minor has any . . . duty . . . with respect to the custodial property
except as provided in sections 38-1001 to 38-1010." Thus, the guardian
could as custodian hold guardianship powers "in trust" free from county
court supervision. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(9) (Reissue 1960).
131 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1104 (Reissue 1960).
132 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-110 (Reissue 1960) (requiring a corporate surety
for an individual guardian if the personal estate is $1,000 or more).
133 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-113 (Reissue 1960).
'34 NEB REV. STAT. § 30-1801 (Supp. 1961). See In re Estate of Grainger, 151
Neb. 555, 38 N.W.2d 435 (1949) (bond required "by a change in the
circumstances or situation of the trustee or for other sufficient reason"
within discretion of county court where trustee proposed to act under
a nominee statute not in existence during the lifetime of testator, even
though the will, itself, referred to a nominee); Mattoon, Ronin, & Troyer,
Selected Probate Questions, 39 NEB. L. REv. 349, 363 (1960): "Therefore,
the county judge has discretion to determine whether or not the waiver
clause in the will will be followed. Generally the court should not in-
terfere with the wishes of the testator unless for good reason .... This
wide discretion invested in the county judge should be exercised with
care and in accordance with the testator's wishes unless there is some
good reason for not complying with his intentions."
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not be bonded. Custodians are ordinarily not required to furnish a
bond,135 although it is possible for the county court to require one. 36
D. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATION.
(1) Jurisdiction.
The Constitution gives county courts "original jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons . . .
appointment of guardians, and settlement of their accounts; and
such other jurisdiction as may be given by general law."'137 Under
this provision, the jurisdiction of county courts over executors and
guardians is exclusive.138
The jurisdiction over inter vivos trusts and trustees, however,
rests in the district courts under general equitable powers."39 Before
1931, the district courts also had general jurisdiction of testamentary
trusts and trustees.' 40 In 1931, the legislature granted statutory
jurisdiction to county courts for testamentary trust administra-
tion.14 ' The technical effect of this amendment has been to provide
a concurrent jurisdiction in supervising the administration of testa-
mentary trusts,14 2 even though, as a practical matter, the administra-
tion is presently being conducted by the county courts.
The scope of county court jurisdiction over testamentary trusts
is unclear. The county court is without jurisdiction to interpret the
135 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1005 (4) (Reissue 1960).
136 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1007(5) -(6) (Reissue 1960).
137 NsB. CONST. art. V, § 16.
138 See, e.g., Rohn v. Kelley, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.2d 711 (1953); Stewart v.
Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552 (1933).
139 See, e.g., Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 236 N.W. 745 (1931).
140 See In re Estate of Frerichs, 120 Neb. 462, 233 N.W. 456 (1930) (rights
of minor under testamentary trust enforceable only in district court
by guardian or next friend).
141 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1801 (Supp. 1961), 30-1802 to 30-1805 (Reissue
1956).
142 See In re Estate of Grblny, 147 Neb. 117, 125, 22 N.W.2d 488, 493 (1946):
"The act of 1931 contains no provisions attempting in any manner to
deprive the district court of its inherent equity jurisdiction over the
supervision of the administration of trusts generally of which, as held
in Burnham v. Bennison, supra, it cannot be legislatively deprived. The
act simply conferred jurisdictional powers upon the county court in all
testamentary trust estates, such as the one at bar, without depriving
the district court of its original equitable powers, whether inherent or
conferred. The result is that the county court and the district court have
concurrent jurisdiction in supervision over the administration of testa-
mentary trusts."
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wills which create testamentary trusts or to exercise equitable juris-
diction insofar as rival claimants are -concerned.14 3 Even under the
constitutionally exclusive jurisdiction in probate matters, the con-
struction of a will by a county court is solely for the purpose of ad-
vising the executor in carrying out his duties and does not determine
the rights of persons beneficially interested under the will.144 The
county court also lacks jurisdiction where the title to real estate is
involved, except to the extent it is incidentally necessary to carry
out other aspects of its jurisdiction.'4 - In the event there is uncer-
tainty in the application of these rules in a given case, the safest
solution from the testamentary trustee's standpoint might be to
institute suit in the district court, pleading the cause so as to invoke
the full range of equitable power of district courts over trust ad-
ministration, construction of documents, and title to real estate.14
In 1957, the legislature enacted provisions permitting probate
assets to be "poured over" into an inter vivos trust and the entire
property administered free from county court supervision so long as
one of the trustees is a corporate fiduciary. 147 As an inter vivos
143 In re Trust Estate of Myers, 151 Neb. 255, 37 N.W.2d 228 (1949) (county
court lacks jurisdiction to try issues of termination of testamentary
trust and distribution of trust corpus); DeWitt v. Sampson, 158 Neb. 653,
64 N.W.2d 352 (1954); cf. In re Estate of Greenamyre, 133 Neb. 693,
276 N.W. 686 (1937) (trustee-beneficiary estopped to contest county
court jurisdiction to order, pursuant to apparent family settlement,
that trust was created under a will).
144 See Lutcavish v. Eaton, 166 Neb. 268, 89 N.W.2d 44 (1958); Stubbs,
Probate Procedures Available to Beneficiaries, 39 NEB. L. REV. 311, 319-
322 (1960).
145 See generally Hahn v. Verret, 143 Neb. 820, 11 N.W.2d 551 (1943).
146 This is based upon the theory that district courts have concurrent juris-
diction with county courts in the supervision of testamentary trust
administration. See note 142 supra. A testamentary trustee cannot
make a jurisdictional error by filing suit with respect to the questionable
item in the district court. This should be distinguished from the con-
servative approach which an executor or administrator might wish to
take. Because of the constitutional exclusive probate jurisdiction of the
county court, an executor or administrator might wish to file parallel
suits in some instances in both the county and district courts to insure
against a jurisdictional deficiency. The two suits might be consolidated
for trial in the district court, but the appeal from the county court to
the district court would not alone invoke the general equitable jurisdic-
tion of the district court. In re Trust Estate of Myers, 151 Neb. 255, 37
N.W.2d 228 (1949).
147 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1806, 30-1807 (Supp. 1961): "A testator may by
will, devise and bequeath real and personal property to a trustee or
to cotrustees of a trust, including an unfunded life insurance trust,
which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the
will is made and which is identified in the will, even though the
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trust, the whole trust would be subject to the general equitable jur-
isdiction of the district court. Unless one co-trustee is a corporate
trustee, the trust would be partially subject to the jurisdiction of
two courts. So much of the property as has been poured over would
be within the continuing county court jurisdiction (and also subject
to the concurrent jurisdiction of the district court148 ), but the bal-
ance of the property would be under the jurisdiction of only the
district court.
149
The county court is given general jurisdiction over custodians
under the gifts to minors statutes. 150 Inasmuch as these statutes re-
flect a legislative attempt to eliminate the ordinary trust and guard-
ianship rules, the statutory jurisdiction of county courts given by
the act may be exclusive in matters concerning custodianship ad-
ministration.' 51
trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation, or termina-
tion. Unless the will provides otherwise, the estate so devised and
bequeathed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instru-
ment creating the trust, including any amendments or modifications in
writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator. The property so devised or bequeathed
shall be administered under the provisions of sections 30-1801 to 30-1805
as if held under a trust created by will unless the designated trustee
or one of the designated cotrustees is a corporate trustee authorized by
law to exercise trust powers. An entire revocation of the trust prior
to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest."
"No trustee or cotrustee of an inter vivos trust, including an unfunded
life insurance trust, shall be required to comply with the provisions of
sections 30-1801 to 30-1805 by reason of any testamentary bequest or de-
vise to him as such trustee if he or one of his cotrustees is a corporate
trustee authorized by law to exercise trust powers unless such compli-
ance is expressly required by the will and if compliance is so required,
only the property so bequeathed or devised shall be subject to admin-
istration under sections 30-1801 to 30-1805."
148 See notes 142 and 146 supra.
149 See Mattoon, Ronin & Troyer, Selected Probate Questions, 39 NEB. L.
REv. 349, 372 (1960): "This may create an awkward situation, because
as a result, the trustee must manage two trusts which may not be
computable. This is of importance to draftsmen. If the testator has
confidence in the trustee, it is advisable to omit provisions requiring
compliance with the testamentary trust statute where property is
poured into an existing trust." See also Troyer, Problems in Probate
and Administration Procedure, 37 NEB. L. REV. 134, 144-148 (1958).
150 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001(4) (Reissue 1960).
'51 This question is theoretically difficult. If the custodianship statute
is an aspect of guardianship, county court original jurisdiction would
need to be exclusive. But a trust analogy would mean that the district
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction under the inherent equitable
powers. The statute should probably be viewed simply as a statutory
creature, distinct from either guardianship or trust comparisons. As
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(2) General Procedure for Judicial Supervision.
A significant difference in the operation of guardianships, inter
vivos trusts, testamentary trusts, and custodianships is found in the
degree of judicial supervision given to matters of fiduciary admin-
istration. Supervision of inter vivos trusts and custodianships occurs
only when sought by an interested party. Ordinarily, no judicial
determinations are necessary to complete these arrangements, al-
though neither trust law' 52 nor the custodianship statute 53 makes it
necessary to allege mismanagement to secure a judicial accounting.
The court inquiry, if any, is one of determining whether the fidu-
ciary has acted within the range of discretion permitted by the trust
instrument or by the gifts to minors statutes.
In the case of trusts, the available remedies would follow the
ordinary procedure for equity suits in the district courts. Custodian-
ship matters are handled under county court practice. In either
case, it would probably be necessary to join the minor as a party to
the action and see that his interests are protected by a guardian ad
litem.
Guardianships and testamentary trusts are subject to the con-
tinuing supervision of county courts. Both are required to file in-
ventories, periodic accountings, and final accountings. 154
The nature and extent of judicial supervision of testamentary
trusts and guardianships is quite different. A trustee is required
to render an initial accounting, submit periodic accounts "at such
times as the court shall direct,"'15 and "faithfully execute such
trust under the direction of the court according to the true intent
and meaning thereof."'156 In general a testamentary trustee is free
to act within the ordinary standard of fiduciary care in performing
such, the county court would appear to have exclusive jurisdiction to
try an action brought under the provisions of the act, but this would
not preclude any other form of suit, existing apart from the statute,
to be brought in the district court under the general equitable or civiljurisdiction of district courts. See notes 142 and 146 supra.
152 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 963 at 21 (2d ed. 1962).
153 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1008 (Reissue 1960).
154 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1801 (Supp. 1961); 38-110, 38-505 (Reissue 1960);
see NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-607, 24-609 (Reissue 1956).
155 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1801(2) (Supp. 1961). The virtually identical
language in the guardianship provisions has been construed to require
annual reports. See 3 WHITFORD, NEBRASKA PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
1450-1451 (1957).
156 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1801(3) (Supp. 1961).
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discretionary acts.15 7 The phrase "under the direction of the court"
probably implies no more than that the court, on its own motion
or the request of an interested party, can require the trustee to carry
out the terms of the trust and exercise the discretion given to the
trustee. 5 8 The phrase has not been interpreted in practice to require
continuous approval of administrative matters by the county court.
The role of the county court is to see that the trustee uses the dis-
cretion reposed in him; its role is not to substitute the discretion of
the court for that of the trustee.
Unless specific directions appear in the trust instrument, the
primary discretion which is exercised in carrying out the terms of a
testamentary trust is that of the trustee. The role of the court is to
correct a nonuse or misuse of the testamentary trustee's discretion-
ary authority.
In guardianship matters, the statutes appear to contemplate that
the court exercise a primary continuing supervision over adminis-
trative matters. The statutes require advance court approval for
157 Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956); In re Sullivan's
Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); In re Vohland's Estate, 135
Neb. 77, 280 N.W. 241 (1938); see Reed v. Ringsby, 156 Neb. 33, 54
N.W.2d 318 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
158 See Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 369, 76 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1956) (head-
notes by the court): "Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with
respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control
by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.
The extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee is measured by
the settlor's manifestation of intention, and the manner in which a
trustee shall exercise his function rests ordinarily within his own dis-
cretion and judgment. In the matter of control of discretionary powers
of a trustee, the real question is whether it appears that the trustee
is acting in that state of mind in which it was contemplated by the
settlor that he should act. The mere fact that, if the discretion had been
conferred upon the court, the court would have exercised the power
differently is not ordinarily a sufficient reason for interfering with the
exercise of power by the trustee. If discretion is conferred upon the
trustee in the exercise of a power, the court will not interfere unless the
trustee in exercising or failing to exercise the power acts dishonestly,
or with an improper even though not a dishonest motive, or fails to use
his judgment, or acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.";
3 WHITFORD, NEBRASKA PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 1591-1592 (1957):
"Where a will bequeaths property in trust for certain purposes but
with a provision that the trustees have 'full and uncontrolled discretion
as to the application of said income and trust estate for the use afore-
said' the court may order the trustees to act to carry out a purpose of
the trust but it cannot specify their action. For example, it can order
the trustees of a trust for support of a beneficiary to do something for
the dependents of that beneficiary but it cannot specify a certain sum
per month."
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virtually all matters affecting guardianship principal, such as sale
of personal or real property, investment of funds, borrowing or lend-
ing funds, or use of principal for support and education.159 Only the
guardianship income may be expended for maintenance and educa-
tion without prior authorization.160
Under both guardianships and testamentary trusts, there are a
multitude of procedural problems which could conceivably arise
from the requirement of judicial supervision. For example, consider
the issue of giving notice of an application for court approval. For
the adjudication to be effective, notice of the hearing, and in some
cases the actual report or petition, must be given to all persons
whose rights are involved in the determination. Also, if a minor is
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard, then it is neces-
sary to have a guardian ad litem appointed for him in order that the
adjudication be final as to his rights.
One area of uncertainty concerns who will be considered as
"interested parties." The provision dealing with the sale of guard-
ianship personal estate and the investment of guardianship funds
requires "such notice to all persons interested therein as the court
shall direct."'161 It is not clear whether the court direction relates
only to the type of notice, or to both the notice and the persons
entitled to receive notice. The guardianship statute covering a
mortgage or pledge of personal property specifies that the county
judge "shall direct to what persons and in what manner notice of
such hearing shall be given."' 62 There might be constitutional ob-
jections to an ex parte determination concerning who is an inter-
ested party which deprives a known individual, whose rights are in
fact affected by the hearing, from receiving notice.163
159 See notes 179, 182, 184-187, 242 infra.
160 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-111 (Reissue 1960); Hoga's Estate v. Look, 134
Mich. 361, 96 N.W. 439 (1903).
161 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-506 (Reissue 1960).
160 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1208 (Reissue 1956).
160 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). But cf. McCaughey
v. Lyall, 224 U.S. 558 (1911); Robards v. Lamb, 127 U.S. 58 (1887);
Florentine v. Barton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 210 (1864). Where judicial
proceedings consist of several distinct steps, it appears that personal
notice of each step must be given because notice at the beginning of
the proceeding would be insufficient for the whole proceeding. City
of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1952); Fraser,
Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
PA.L.REv. 305, 316 (1951). There also are statutory personal notice
requirements in Nebraska specifically requiring that personal notice
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For a sale of guardianship real estate, the statutes provide that
"all those who are next of kin and heirs apparent or presumptive
of the ward shall be considered as interested in the estate. '164 There
is authority under this section that in a guardianship proceeding,
the minor himself is not entitled to notice.165 On the other hand, in
guardianship and testamentary trust accountings, the ward is spe-
cifically entitled to notice, a copy of the report, and a reference
to any other items for which approval is requested; 166 and, al-
by United States mail of published notices be given to every person
appearing to have a direct legal interest "in any action or proceeding
of any kind or nature, as defined in section 25-520.02." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-520.01 (Supp. 1961). NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-520.02 (Supp. 1961):
"The term action or proceeding means all actions and proceedings in
any court and any action or proceeding before the governing bodies
of municipal corporations, public corporations, and political subdivisions
for the equalization of special assessments or assessing the cost of any
public improvement."
164 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-610 (Reissue 1960).
165 Myers v. McGavock, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N.W. 522 (1894). See Thaw v.
Ritchie, 136 U.S. 519 (1889). Since both the court and the guardian
have duties of protecting the interests of the minor, notice to the minor
would seem unnecessary. The whole purpose of the judicial deter-
mination, however, is to determine whether the proposed action of the
guardian is in the minor's interests. Neither the guardian nor the court
is an advocate on behalf of the minor. When the guardian's actions are
in question, the court has a duty not only to the ward but to all "inter-
ested parties." It is strange that the minor's heirs at law are entitled
to notice but not the minor. From a policy standpoint, it would seem
that at least if the minor were more than fourteen years old (the age
at which he alone might be served with a summons and an age at which
he could request the appointment of and nominate a guardian) he
should be entitled to notice and an opportunity to have his own views
and wishes presented for consideration. The views, analysis and con-
tribution of the minor could, subject to final court discretion, prove
advantageous to the best use of the guardianship property. Yet, it would
be preposterous that the court might need to appoint, or the minor
request, a guardian ad litem to examine the routine actions of the
guardian. As a practical matter, the protection afforded the minor from
the general guardian and court discretion may be sufficient. The court
could, if it thought necessary, appoint a representative for the minor's
interest at any time. What this analysis indicates is that there may be
no real need for judicial approval of a number of guardianship matters
which now require advance court action. If the court proceeding really
is designed to achieve important substantive results, and if the conse-
quences are significant enough to warrant notice to the contingent takers
upon the ward's death, then a strong argument can be made in favor
of giving the minor notice and an opportunity to be heard in the matter.
106 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-611 (requiring these items to be mailed to each
living beneficiary and providing, in effect, that a minor cannot waive
their receipt), 24-606(2) (c) (Reissue 1956) (defining beneficiary to in-
clude ward).
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though the guardian also receives colies,167 the minor himself can
personally file objections or exceptions. 168 This could mean that to
have a guardianship accounting conclusive as to the ward, it is
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem.' G9
The provisions covering guardianship and testamentary trust
accountings also provide for mailing the reports, notices and other
papers to each living beneficiary, which apparently includes con-
tingent beneficiaries.170 There could be some question concerning
the meaning of "contingent beneficiary," such as whether a residu-
ary beneficiary under the will is a contingent beneficiary for pur-
poses of testamentary trust administration. Read as a whole, the
statute requires notice to every known individual whose rights are
in fact at stake in the proceeding. It might be well for guardians and
testamentary trustees to take this approach in all situations requir-
ing notice, whether or not such complete notice is required by the
court.
(3) Requirement of Prior Judicial Approval.
Under only the guardianship statutes is there a requirement of
advance judicial approval for items of routine administration.
Trustees may exercise administrative powers free from prior court
supervision unless limited by the trust instrument.1'7 ' It is possible
for any fiduciary or interested party to request court directions or a
declaration of rights in unusual or unclear situations,'7 2 but the
167 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-612 (Reissue 1956).
168 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-614 (Reissue 1956).
109 This result might also be required by the due process clause. See Fraser,
Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
PA.L.REv. 305, 319 (1951): "Actual notice is insufficient because of
the ward's incapacity, therefore a guardian ad litem should be ap-
pointed prior to the settlement of the guardian's account in order to
satisfy due process . . . . When a person is subject to a disability, a
guardian must be appointed to protect his interests. This is true in all
types of cases, not just guardianship cases."
170 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-608 (6), 24-611 (Reissue 1956).
171 See notes 157 and 158 supra, concerning the requirements applicable
to a testamentary trustee, especially that the trust be executed "under
the direction of the court."
172 NEB REV. STAT. § 25-21,152 (Reissue 1956). A similar power would also
exist under the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the district courts. The
statutory jurisdiction of the county court (and constitutional jurisdiction
over guardianships) can also be construed to contain this authority in-
sofar as the court otherwise has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
adjudication.
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normal trust operation is carried on without advance court pro-
ceedings.
A custodian would also normally be expected to act without
court supervision of administrative matters. The custodianship
statutes do, however, contain specific provisions permitting judicial
authorization of expenditure of custodial property for support,
maintenance or education upon application of a parent, guardian or
minor over fourteen,7 3 or the custodian, 7 4 and court orders for the
compensation of the custodian, 175 approval of accountings, 176 re-
moval of custodian or posting of a bond by the custodian,' 77 per-
mission to resign as custodian and designation of a successor cus-
todian. 78
A guardian may not sell, exchange or otherwise transfer guard-
ianship personal property without prior approval of the county
court.1 79 This requires notice to interested parties and a hearing. 80
The consequence of improper court approval may be that the sale is
173 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(3) (Reissue 1960).
174 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(2) (Reissue 1960).
175 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1005(3) (b) (Reissue 1960).
176 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1008 (Reissue 1960).
177 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1007(5) & (6) (Reissue 1960).
178 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1007 (3) & (4) (Reissue 1960).
179 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-506 (Reissue 1960): "The county courts in their
respective counties, on the application of a guardian, or of any person
interested in the estate of any ward, after such notice to all persons
interested therein as the court shall direct, may authorize or require
the guardian to sell and transfer any stock in public funds, or in any
bank or corporation, or any other personal estate or effects held by him
as guardian, and to invest the proceeds of such sale, and also any other
money in his hands in accordance with the provisions of section 24-601,
or in real estate, life insurance, endowment insurance or annuities, as
the county court may authorize"; Hendrix v. Richards, 57 Neb. 794, 796,
78 N.W. 378, 379 (1899): "A fair construction of the foregoing language
leads to the conclusion that if the guardian desires to dispose of the
ward's property of the nature described in the law, he must submit the
matter to the proper probate (county) court, and obtain its order that
it be done. The words of the section are 'may authorize or require,' and
the meaning seems perfectly clear; a sale or transfer of the property
of the ward must be by the authorization of the court." See First Trust
Co. v. Hammond, 139 Neb. 546, 298 N.W. 144 (1941); Wilkins v. Deal,
128 Neb. 78, 257 N.W. 486 (1934); Coe v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co.,
110 Neb. 322, 193 N.W. 708 (1923).
180 NEB. Rav. STAT. § 38-506 (Reissue 1960) ("after such notice to all persons
interested therein as the court shall direct"); see In re Estate of O'Brien,
80 Neb. 125, 113 N.W. 1001 (1907) (ex parte county court approval of
annual account was not authorization for a loan made by the guardian).
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voidable by the minor against a party who knows of the guardian-
ship relationship,'"' and that the guardian becomes a virtual insurer
of the value of the property.
The same statute provides that a guardian must obtain court ap-
proval to invest guardianship funds. If he fails to secure judicial
approval and loss results, the guardian is liable for the full principal
plus legal interest. 8 2 The limitation requiring judicial approval is in
addition to the comparatively conservative legal list of investments
to which guardians are limited.8 3
A guardian is also required to secure authority to borrow
funds,' 8 4 mortgage or pledge the guardianship personal property, 8 5
loan guardianship property,8 " and sell or mortgage real estate. 87
The real estate provisions are especially complicated, requiring not
only the county court proceedings, but a cumbersome procedure in
the district court,' 8 and if the property to be sold has a value of
five hundred dollars, a public sale. 8 9
Reading the guardianship provisions as a whole, it appears that
the county court is expected to exercise a much higher degree of
discretion in administrative matters than might be done by the
court under a testamentary trust. This seems apparent both from
the fact that it is advance approval which the statutes require, and
from the wide variety of items placed under court supervision by
the statutes. Especially in situations where the ward may not
be entitled to notice, the court is expected to act in the best interests
of the ward and his estate. This implies that the ultimate discretion
rests with the court rather than with the guardian. The court merely
supervises the exercise of discretion by a testamentary trustee, but it
can be expected to participate much more materially in the actual
exercise of discretion by a guardian.
The probable reason for this unusually high degree of judicial
supervision is that guardians are quite likely to be laymen, normally
181 Hendrix v. Richards, 57 Neb. 794, 78 N.W. 378 (1899).
182 In re Guardianship of Morris, 145 Neb. 319, 16 N.W.2d 442 (1944); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 38-506 (Reissue 1960); note 179 supra.
183 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-601 (Supp. 1961).
184 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1207, 30-1208 (Reissue 1956).
185 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1207, 30-1208 (Reissue 1956).
180 In re Guardianship of Morris, 145 Neb. 319, 16 N.W.2d 442 (1944); In re
Guardianship of Phillips, 144 Neb. 183, 13 N.W.2d 99 (1944); In re
Estate of O'Brien, 80 Neb. 125, 113 N.W. 1001 (1907).
187 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 38-601 to 38-643 (Reissue 1960).
ss NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-607 (Reissue 1960).
189 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-613 (Supp. 1961).
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a relative of the minor or some other person having custody of the
child. Trustees are more likely to be generally informed in business
affairs.
There are a number of disadvantages to the requirement of
prior court approval. There is always the added cost, nuisance, and
risk of procedural error. In addition, matters of investment may
require immediate attention. Maintenance of a proper investment
portfolio involves not only buying sound assets, but continuing to
review and reinvest the fund as events change. The guardian is
extremely burdened in these matters by the statutory requirements.
(4) Nonjudicial Settlement of Accounts.
A judicial settlement of trust accounts, and perhaps some guard-
ianship matters, does not bind a minor unless he is represented by
a guardian ad litem. Thus, a fiduciary may be potentially subject
to claims by the minor until he is barred by becoming of legal age.
This raises a possibility of tremendous cumulative liability. As a
result, the estate may be depleted by expensive and cumbersome
full-scale periodic judicial accountings with the appointment of
guardians ad litem for the minors. In the absence of these pro-
cedures, fiduciaries customarily will be extremely cautious in the
management of the account. 90
The mechanism for settling guardian and custodian accounts is
fixed by the statutory provisions discussed above, but, to some
degree, the problems of periodic accountings for trusts may be
lessened by effective trust draftsmanship. For instance, the trustee
may be allowed a broad discretion in exercising administrative
powers, or may be given a general or special power of appointment
to alter the beneficial interests under the trust. These powers reduce
the likelihood of hidden potential liability which may trap a trustee
regardless of his good faith and freedom from negligence. In addi-
tion, a trust may contain an exculpatory provision limiting the
liability of the trustee to matters of gross negligence, wilful default,
or acts done in bad faith. 91
Many trusts now provide that the trustee periodically render an
accounting to some person or persons whose approval of the matters
190 See Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 40 (1957).
.191 Fleener v. Omaha Nat'l Co., 131 Neb. 253, 267 N.W. 462 (1936). A non-
compensated custodian is liable only for losses from bad faith, intentional
wrongdoing, gross negligence, or failure to comply with the "prudent
man" standard in investments. NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1005(5) (Reissue
1960).
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shown in the accounting becomes binding upon everyone who may
claim an interest under the trust.192 This provision could have
special value where minors are interested in the disposition. Pre-
sumably, the person selected to approve the accounting would be
someone having an identity of interest with the minor under the
trust or a parent or other person concerned generally with pro-
tecting the welfare of the minor.193 It should be noted, however, that
this clause does not free the trustee from the duty of rendering
an accounting to the beneficiaries. While a provision dispensing
altogether with a trustee's duty to account would probably be held
invalid, 94 the proposed clause merely provides a nonjudicial method
for settling the account submitted by the trustee.
The Restatement of Trusts takes the position that such a pro-
cedure for a nonjudicial settlement of accounts is valid and enforce-
able. 195 The reasoning is that the settlor should be free to dispose
192 The most comprehensive analysis of these practices is Westfall, Non-
judicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1957).
The following clauses are typical:
"The Trustee shall each year render an account of its administration of
the trust to the person or persons of full age entitled at the time to
receive its income. Such person's or persons' written approval of such
an account shall, as to all matters and transactions stated therein, be
final and binding upon all persons (whether in being or not) who are
then or may thereafter become entitled to share in either the principal
or the income of the trust." Id. at 60 (specimen form from Old Colony
Trust Company).
"If such person or one or more of such persons is a minor, his parents
or surviving parent may act for such person in approving such an
account with the same effect as if such minor had been of full age and
had himself approved such account. Nothing contained in this paragraph
shall be deemed to give such parents or surviving parent acting in con-junction with the Trustee the power or right to enlarge or shift the
beneficial interest of any beneficiary of the trust." Id. at 76.
193 Id. at 74-76.
194 See cases collected in Annot., 171 A.L.R. 631 (1947). But cf. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS § 172, comment d (1959): "Such a provision is effec-
tive, unless, as in the case of testamentary trusts in some states, there
is a statutory requirement for court accounting which cannot be dis-
pensed with."
195 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 172, comment d (1959): "By the terms
of the trust it may be provided that the trustee shall submit an account-
ing to a particular person, for example one of the beneficiaries of the
trust, and that the approval of the account by that person shall discharge
the trustee. Such a provision is effective, provided that the third person
acts in good faith in giving his approval and provided that the trustee
made a proper disclosure in his accounting of his conduct in the admin-
istration of the trust." See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS 1290-92 (2d ed. 1956). For
federal estate and gift tax purposes "the right in a beneficiary of a trust
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of his property upon whatever basis and with whatever powers over
the property he may specify in the trust instrument; the bene-
ficiaries receive only so much as they are granted under the instru-
ment; and the long-range interests of both the beneficiaries and
trustees are enhanced by such a provision.196 It also seems likely
that there is an overriding equitable jurisdiction in Nebraska
district courts to remedy acts of fraud or bad faith in the administra-
tion of this clause. 97
There is some authority and reasoning, however, against the
validity of a provision for a binding nonjudicial settlement of ac-
counts.9 8 The clause may violate the statutory provisions concern-
ing testamentary trust accounting in the county court.199 The clause
also could be invalid as in derogation of the statutes providing for
guardians to handle the property interests of minors, 200 the inherent
to assent to a periodic accounting, thereby relieving the trustee from
further accountability, is not a power of appointment if the right of
assent does not consist of any power or right to enlarge or shift the
beneficial interest of any beneficiary therein." Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2041-
1 (b) (1), 25.2514-1(b) (1).
190 See Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1957).
197 See Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 298, 236 N.W. 745, 748-49 (1931):
"Indeed, the inherent power of a court of equity to supervise and control
trustees in the execution of their trust is well recognized. In the proper
exercise of this power, courts may review and revise the exercise of the
discretion of a trustee, and if they find there has been an abuse of dis-
cretion, or if the trustee has acted in bad faith, or has failed to follow
the directions and requirements imposed by the terms of the trust, or
the requirements of the law, such trustee's conduct will be subject tojudicial control, and the court will make such orders as may be necessary
to fully effect the purpose of the trust and to secure to the beneficiaries
therein their just rights as lawfully intended and expressed by the
creator thereof."
198 See BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 973, at 249-50 (2d ed. 1962): "If
the settlor tries to reduce the accounting duty of the trustee, either by
providing that the common-law duty shall be diminished or by stipulat-
ing that it shall not be necessary for his trustee to obey a duty to account
expressed in statutory form, it would seem that the effort should be
invalid and the duty of the trustee unaffected. The settlor ought not to
be able to oust the court of its constitutional or statutory jurisdiction,
or to override the acts of the Legislature concerning information to be
furnished by trustees to their beneficiaries.... There is a small amount
of authority on the subject. The better reasoned decisions hold that the
trustee still must account to the proper court."
199 See Blatz Estate, 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 117 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
200 This argument might be especially forceful in a situation where the
power of approval is in a nonbeneficiary of the trust (such as a parent
or person having custody of the child), since the actions of that person
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equitable jurisdiction of district courts,20 1 or of the constitutional
requirement that every person shall have a remedy in court for
every injury done him.20 2
All in all, however, there seems to be nothing in the use of a
clause for the nonjudicial settlement of accounts which could do
more than invalidate that particular provision. If this is correct,
then there would be everything to gain and nothing to lose by the
use of the clause in at least all inter vivos trusts where minors are
involved. Even though the clause were in the trust, the trustee
still might be well advised to seek a judicial determination of the
issue if a known question arises. The presence of the clause might
provide an additional barrier against unforeseen future trustee
liability of a considerable amount.20 3
would exist only to protect the interests of the minor, the traditional
role of guardianships. But a trust for the sole purpose of protecting a
minor's interest is not itself invalid on that ground. Also, a power of a
parent to act in his own interest, even if adverse to that of the minor,
might be valid. See Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlement of Trustees' Ac-
counts, 71 HnRv. L. R.v. 40, 74-75 (1957). The "unduly formal" result
may be that if, as a result of the legal draftsmanship, "the transferor
has purported to create a power in the minor himself but to make such
power exercisable on his behalf by another . . . [arguably, it would
contravene the statutes enacted to require the appointment of guardi-
ans] inasmuch as the parent may act on behalf of the minor without
the statutory safeguard."
201 See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9; Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 236 N.W.
745 (1931); cf., NEB. CONST. art. V, § 16.
202 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Nebraska Court has held that unexecuted
agreements to arbitrate claims under an insurance policy, private con-
tract or collective labor agreement, whether of all disputes arising under
the contract or merely the amount of loss or damages, will not be
enforced, and a refusal to arbitrate is not a defense to an action on the
contract. See, e.g., Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb.
160, 43 N.W.2d 657, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951); Rentscher v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934); Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902); German-American Ins. Co. v.
Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889). But an award of an arbitra-
tor made upon a voluntary and unrevoked submission of the parties
does not become enforceable when made. See, e.g., Connecticut Fire
Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 69 N.W. 118 (1896).
203 On the other hand, there is some possibility that a fiduciary could rely
upon the clause to his detriment if the provision were later found to
be invalid. Further, the presence of such a clause might be used
persuasively as a legal argument for withholding some other judicial
remedy which the trustee might seek. See Annot., Contractual Provision
as to Remedy as Excluding Other Possible Remedies, 84 A.L.R.2d 322(1962). It has been held, for example, that a mortgagee in possession
of the mortgaged premises by agreement with the mortgagor cannot have
a receiver appointed because he should continue to collect the rents
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E. APPLICATION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL.
The authority of a fiduciary to expend income and principal for
the minor is, of course, at the very core of the donor's wishes in
making economic wealth available to the minor. Under Nebraska
law, the availability of property held by a fiduciary for a minor is
tightly interwoven with a definition of the legal obligation of sup-
port which other persons may have toward the minor. The legal
obligation of support by a mother, for instance, is probably ex-
tinguished by property owned by the child. A father's support ob-
ligation is not normally lessened by the fact that his child has
property (although it may be in a few limited instances), and the
guardianship rules preclude an expenditure of any guardianship
property to the extent the father does have a support obligation.
The definition of a legal obligation of support, then, can be both
determined by, and determinative of, the amount of property which
can be expended by the fiduciary. For federal tax purposes, the
legal obligation of support as defined under state law may become
a critical element in determining who, within the family, is subject
to income, gift or estate taxes.
The next three portions of this article deal with these three
questions. This section considers the circumstances in which guard-
ianship, custodianship and trust income and principal can or must
be expended for the minor. The following section outlines the
federal tax consequences which may occur from property ownership
by or for a minor. And the succeeding section considers the special
and difficult (if not impossible) problems of defining and character-
izing the legal obligation of support under Nebraska law.
(1) Trusts.
A trustee may pay the trust income or principal to or apply it
for the benefit of any person or object permitted in the trust in-
strument. 2 4 The legal issues which arise with respect to the use
and profits himself without burdening the mortgagor with the additional
expenses of a receiver. Hays v. Christiansen, 105 Neb. 586, 181 N.W.
379 (1921). See Note, 14 NEB. L. BULL. 272, 275-76 (1936): "For the
same reason, a receivership should be denied a mortgagee where the
mortgage contains a stipulation that the mortgagee shall have possession
of the premises on default or during foreclosure; the mortgagee in such
case has his proper remedy by the very terms of the mortgage, and
should not be permitted to subject the mortgagor to the added expense
of a receivership."
204 For a discussion of the general rules concerning the power of a trustee
to exercise discretionary authority, see Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368,
76 N.W. 2d 239 (1956); notes 157 and 158 supra.
ESTATE PLANNING FOR MINORS
of trust income and corpus are primarily ones of drafting and in-
terpreting the authority of the trust instrument to require or permit
an expenditure of funds in accordance with the trustor's wishes.
(2) Custodianships.
The authority of a custodian to expend funds is extremely broad
and seems relatively clear. The statute provides that:205
The custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by
him, or expend for the minor's benefit, so much or all of the cus-
todial property as the custodian deems advisable for the support,
maintenance, education, and benefit of the minor in the manner, at
the time or times, and to the extent that the custodian in his discre-
tion deems suitable and proper, with or without court order, with
or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other person to
'sUpport the minor or his ability to do so, and with or without regard
to any other income or property of the minor which may be appli-
cable or available for any such purposes.
(3) Guardianships.
In contrast to the authority of trustees and custodians, the
present Nebraska statutes concerning the application of guardian-
ship income and principal seem ambiguous, conflicting and un-
explainable. An analysis of the historical development of the sec-
tions, however, may provide a sufficient explanation of what the
various provisions are designed to accomplish even if it does not
lead to a thorough understanding of their meaning and interrela-
tionship. What this analysis shows is primarily a need for legislative
revision rather than a guide for conscientious property managers or
estate planners. Nevertheless, answers to many of the critical issues
affecting the use of income and principal by a guardian rest upon
the rather general inferences which can be drawn from a number
of separate Nebraska statutes.
The initial Nebraska statutes were adopted by the territorial
legislatures in 1856 and 1860, following Wisconsin statutes.200 Wis_
205 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(2) (Reissue 1960). Subparagraph (3) provides:
"The court, on the petition of a parent or guardian of the minor or of
the minor, if he has attained the age of fourteen years, may order the
custodian to pay over to the minor for expenditure by him or to expend
so much of or all the custodial property as is necessary for the minor's
support, maintenance or education."
206 Neb. Terr. Laws c. XLV, § 43 (predecessor of part of § 38-601) (1856);
Neb. Terr. Laws c. LIII, §§ 10 (predecessor of § 38-111), 22 (predecessor
of § 38-501), 24 (predecessor of § 38-503) (1856); Neb. Terr. Laws c.
III, § 1, p. 66 (predecessor of part of § 38-601) (1860). See Wis. REV.
STAT. c. 64, § 1 (1849); Wis. REV. STAT. C. 80, §§ 9, 20, 22 (1849); Wis.
REV. STAT. c. 65, § 38 (1849).
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consin had taken the statutes from Michigan in 1849, and Michigan
from Massachusetts in 1838.
Under the general rules of statutory construction, these pro-
visions derived from Wisconsin, Michigan and Massachusetts have
been held to adopt the intrepretation of the sections in the other
states at the time of their enactment by Nebraska.2 7 Any con-
struction by the other states after the introduction into Nebraska
would, of course, have only persuasive effect in interpreting the
Nebraska law.
(a) Section 38-503.
The Massachusetts law, insofar as guardianships for minors are
concerned, originated in a 1783 enactment. 20 8 One of the Nebraska
sections which can be traced directly to the Massachusetts act of
1783 is section 38-503, which now provides: 20 9
Every guardian shall manage the estate of his ward frugally
and without waste, and apply the income and profit thereof, as far
as may be necessary, for the comfortable and suitable maintenance
and support of the ward and his family, if there be any. If such
income and profits shall be insufficient for that purpose, the guar-
dian may sell the real estate, upon obtaining a license therefor,
as provided by law, and shall apply the proceeds of such sale, as
far as may be necessary, for the maintenance and support of the
ward and his family, if there be any.
The language "income and profit thereof"2 10 seems clearly to
contrast expenditure of income items from the balance of "the
estate." This has been the uniform interpretation of the section
throughout the years.
207 See, e.g., Stark v. Stark, 128 Neb. 524, 259 N.W. 523 (1935); Goble v.
Simeral, 67 Neb. 276, 93 N.W. 235 (1903). See also Myers v. McGavock,
39 Neb. 843, 58 N.W. 522 (1894).
208 Mass. Acts & Res. c. 38, § 4 (1783).
209 NFB. REv. STAT. § 38-503 (Reissue 1960).
210 This phrase probably means "net income" in a sense comparable to
that used for purposes of ordinary trust accounting. The term "profit"
would not seem to contemplate capital gains, which are likely properly
allocable to corpus. It is not clear whether the phrase "income and
profit" means (a) net income for the current year only, (b) net income
from the inception of the guardianship, (c) total annual net income
from the inception of the guardianship without regard to years of
deficit, or (d) net income from the time of any previous deficit. With
respect to these questions, the litigation concerning analagous problems
under trust law would seem relevant. There is also considerable his-
torical precedent under statutes concerning the payment of corporate
dividends which might present analagous issues.
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The phrase "as far as may be necessary" probably has two
ramifications: (1) as a limitation on the quality of "comfortable
and suitable maintenance and support," and (2) as a limitation
on the application of funds where another has a legal obligation
to support the ward. To the extent that any person has an obliga-
tion to support the ward, it would not appear "necessary" to expend
guardianship income.
The second sentence of the section permits a sale of real estate
if the income and profits are insufficient to provide maintenance
and support. The failure of this section, and other sections, initially
to consider an application of items of principal other than real
estate might be explainable in that the statutes originated out of
the practices in Massachusetts and England in the 1700's. At that
time, personal property, other than income and profits, might not
readily have been thought of as having economic significance in
providing continuing expenses of maintenance and support.
This section does not refer to the use of the funds for pur-
poses of "education." Historically, however, there is some authority
for treating at least a limited education as an aspect of maintenance
and support, and this statute could be so construed.211
(b) Section 38-501.
A related provision, section 38-501, states: 212
Every legally appointed guardian, whether for a minor or for
any other person, shall pay all just debts due from the ward out
of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if suffi-
cient; or if not, then out of his real estate, upon obtaining license
for the sale thereof, and disposing of the same in the manner pro-
vided by law.
The original statute would appear to have been concerned with
the payment of debts existing at the establishment of a guardian-
ship. The initial language can be traced through the 1783 Massa-
chusetts statute to a Massachusetts Bay Province enactment of 1726,
211 See, e.g., Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844) (though
recognizing that a "good common school education" was necessary for
an infant, held that a college education did not rank as such, and thus
the infant defendant was not liable on contract). The word "education"
was added to other statutes carried into Nebraska law. Massachusetts
used the word "education" in the original version of Section 38-111 in
1836. MAss. REV. STAT. c. 78, § 2 (1836). Michigan added the word to
what is now Section 38-601 in 1838. MxcH. REv. STAT. pt. 2, tit. V, c. 2,
§ 1 (1838).
212 NEE. REV. STAT. § 38-501 (Reissue 1960).
44 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 1
applicable only to guardianships for mentally incompetents.
213 It
provided that the guardianship was subject "to the payment of all
such just debts, owing by such persons, which were contracted
before their distraction, out of the personal estate of such idiots,
persons non compos, or distracted, or, in case that not be sufficient,
then out of the real estate." This phrase was repeated in substan-
tially the same language in the legislation of 1783 which added
guardianships for minors.214 The language of the present Nebraska
statute, "and the income of his real estate," was added by Michigan
in 1846215 and then carried into Wisconsin and Nebraska law.21 6
The application of the statute to debts existing at the com-
mencement of a guardianship may explain why the term "personal
estate" was used in this section and not in the other relevant sec-
tions.21 7 Upon the opening of a guardianship, personal property,
even cash, crops or similar property, would not have been thought
of as income or profits. "Personal estate" might have been an
appropriate term to cover economic wealth of the early 1700's which
could be used for the payment of existing debts although it would
not have been descriptive of that which could be used to satisfy
the support and maintenance of the ward over a period of time
during the continuation of the guardianship.
213 Mass. Bay Prov. Acts & Res. c. 12, § 5 (1726).
214 Mass. Acts & Res. c. 38, §§ 1, 4 (1783). This could explain the statutory
reference to debts "before distraction" even though a minor could not
technically have any debts contracted before his "distraction." In this
regard, "distraction" might refer to the creation of the guardianship,
at which time the minor could be liable for some debts. But, after com-
mencement, the fact that the guardian has a duty to supply necessaries
for the ward would mean that the ward could not normally incur "just
debts."
215 MICH. REv. STAT. tit. XX, c. 86, § 21 (1846).
216 Wis. REV. STAT. c. 80, § 20 (1849); Neb. Terr. Laws c. LIII, § 22 (1856).
217 The first use of the term "personal estate" in a section applicable to
the expenditure of guardianship funds other than in this section appears
to have been in 1836 when what is now section 38-604 was added. MASS.
REV. STAT. c. 72, § 3 (1836). Massachusetts first amended its laws -to
deal specifically with the problem of expenditure of personal property
principal for support and education in 1844. Mass. Acts & Res. c. 88
(1844). The forerunner of present section 38-601 used the phrase "goods,
chattels, rights and credits" as being subject to the payment of just
debts of the ward. MASS. REV. STAT. c. 71, § 26 (1836). Massachusetts
changed this phrase to "personal estate" in 1882 and Nebraska did so in
1913. Mass. Pub. Stat. c. 140, § 1 (1882); NEB. REV. STAT. § 1675 (1913);
cf. Annot., What Passes Under the Term "Personal Estate" in Will, 53
A.L.R. 2d 1059 (1957).
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(c) Section 38-601.
Section 38-601 is another statute having its origin in the Massa-
chusetts laws of 1783. It now provides: 218
When the income of the estate of any person under guardian-
ship, whether a minor, insane person, idiot, spendthrift, or other
person, shall not be sufficient to maintain the ward and his family
or to educate the ward, when a minor, or the children of such insane
person or other person under guardianship, or when the personal
property in the hands of the guardian of any person under guardi-
anship shall be insufficient to pay all of the debts of his ward, with
charges of managing his estate, or when the improvements on the
said real estate of the ward are not in use and are deteriorating in
value to the injury of the ward's estate, the guardian of any such
person may sell the real estate, including the homestead, of his
ward, or the improvements thereon, for any of the purposes enu-
merated above. He shall first obtain a license therefor and take pro-
ceedings therein as provided in sections 38-601 to 38-643.
The section has had an interesting history. Originally in 1783,219
it appeared merely as a power of sale in the same section as the
forerunners of sections 38-503 and 38-501. The Massachusetts statu-
tory revision of 1836 divided the section into two virtually unrelated
sections,220 and the two sections remained separate through the
movement to Michigan 22.1 Wisconsin 222 and Nebraska22 3 until they
were reunited into a single provision in the Nebraska statutory
revision of 1913.224
In its original form, the section was merely a grant of pro-
cedural authority to sell guardianship property. The Massachusetts
revision of 1836 appears to have used the portion dealing with the
insufficiency of income to support the ward and his family as con-
venient draftsmanship to initiate the procedural provisions cover-
ing the sale of guardianship real estate. This was in the same gen-
eral physical arrangement as present sections 38-601 and following.
The provisions concerning a deficiency of personal property to pay
debts were contained in a separate chapter dealing with the pay-
ment of debts by executors, administrators and guardians. Histori-
cally, then, the first portion of section 38-601 is a procedural coun-
218 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-601 (Supp. 1961).
219 Mass. Acts. & Res. c. 38, § 4 (1783).
220 MAss. REV. STAT. c. 71, § 26, and c. 72, § 1 (1836).
221 MIcH. REV. STAT. pt. 2, tit. V, c. 1, § 24, and c. 2, § 1 (1838).
222 Wis. REV. STAT. c. 65, § 38, and c. 64, § 1 (1849).
223 Neb. Terr. Laws c. 45, § 43 (1856); Neb. Terr. Laws c. 3, § 1, p. 66 (1860).
224 NEB. REV. STAT. § 1675 (1913).
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terpart for the substantive section 38-503, and the second portion of
38-601 a procedural counterpart for section 38-501.
In this background, it seems reasonable to interpret the phrase
in section 38-601, "sufficient to maintain the ward and his family,"
as being equivalent to the phrase in section 38-503, "as far as may
be necessary, for the comfortable and suitable maintenance and
support of the ward and his family." Also, the term "income" in
section 38-601 would seem to have the same effect as "income and
profit" in section 38-503.
But section 38-601 has acquired some substantive meaning
beyond that of section 38-503. When Michigan adopted the statute
in 1838, the language was added "and to educate the ward when
a minor, and the children of such insane person or spendthrift."2 25
This could constitute a separate grant of substantive authority to
expend income and sell real estate for the education of the ward
or his family. Arguably, this "education" could be more extensive
than that inferred from the phrase "maintenance and support" in
section 38-503..22G This section would not, however, appear to define
a parent's legal duty to provide an education or constitute authority
to expend guardianship funds where the parent does have such
an obligation. It would seem to be implied from the historical
development of the section that, like section 38-503, guardianship
funds cannot be applied where another has a legal obligation to
support or educate the minor.
There is another inference from the present wording of section
38-601 which indicates that the section can be construed as having
a broader substantive meaning than sections 38-503 and 38-501.
Section 38-503 provides for the expenditure of income and the pro-
ceeds from the sale of real estate for the support of the ward. There
is no apparent authority under that section to apply the guardian-
ship personal principal for purposes of support. Section 38-501 may
be construed to permit an expenditure of the entire "personal
estate" but only for paying "debts," which probably means pre-
existing debts.
The Massachusetts revision of 1836, hovever, added the lan-
guage to what is now section 38-601 that when the guardianship
items of personal property are insufficient to "pay all of the just
debts of the ward, with charges of managing his estate," the real
225 MICH. REV. STAT. pt. 2, tit. V, c. 2, § 1 (1838).
226 Concerning the expenditure of funds for "education," see note 211 supra
and note 327 infra. Although "education," is used in section 38-111, that
section does not grant authority to sell real estate.
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estate can be sold for this purpose.227 The language "with charges of
managing his estate" has been construed by the Nebraska court
to be broader than merely paying debts and to include payment
of the expenses of support of the ward.228 From this, there can be
an inference that personal principal may be expended under the
authority of section 38-601 for support.
The purpose of the sections which follow section 38-601, also
stemming from the 1836 Massachusetts revision, would seem to
verify this interpretation of legislative intent. Section 38-604229
states that following the sale of real estate, the proceeds are applied
to the purpose creating the authority for the sale, and the residue
invested by the guardian at interest or "in the best manner in his
power until the capital shall be wanted for the maintenance of the
ward and his family, for the education of the ward when a minor,
or the children of such insane person or spendthrift, in which case
the capital may be used for that purpose, as far as may be neces-
sary, in like manner as if it had been personal estate of the ward."
The 1836 Massachusetts legislature may have acted on an assump-
tion that guardianship personal principal could be used for the
maintenance, support and education of the ward and his family.
(d) Section 38-111.
Section 38-111 is contained in the present provisions relating
exclusively to guardianships for minors, and reads:230
If any minor, who has a father living, has property, the income
of which is sufficient for his maintenance and education in a manner
more expensive than such father can reasonably afford, regard
being had to the situation of the father's family, and to all the
circumstances of the case, the expenses of the education and main-
tenance of such minor may be defrayed out of the income of his
own property, in whole or in part, as shall be judged reasonable,
and shall be directed by the court, and the charges therefor may
be allowed accordingly in the settlement of the account of such
guardian.
The section was first enacted as a part of the general Massa-
chusetts statutory revision of 1836.231 It appears to have been a
codification of previous Massachusetts and common law decisions.
Use of the term "father" and not "mother" may be explained by
227 MAss. REv. STAT. c. 71, § 26 (1836).
228 Seward v. Didier, 16 Neb. 58, 20 N.W. 12 (1884).
229 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-604 (Reissue 1960).
230 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-111 (Reissue 1960).
231 MAss. REV. STAT. c. 78, § 2 (1836).
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the fact that the Massachusetts court had stated that a father's
obligation of support continued although his minor children had
property of their own,23 2 but that a widow did not have an obliga-
tion to support a propertied child.2 33
The phrase "in a manner more expensive than such father can
reasonably afford, regard being had to the situation of the father's
family, and to all the circumstances of the case" is also likely a
codification of common law decisions. There were decisions that
guardianship property could be used to maintain a child in accord-
ance with the child's own property if the father could not afford
such lavish support,234 that the court would not order a father to
support a child in a manner which would cause hardship to other
children of the father,235 and that a father might not be compelled
to support a child where he had been deprived of the custody of
the child.23 6
The statutory reference to "income" and not "principal" seems
significant, although it may have been historical oversight. Regard-
less of the fact that the 1836 Massachusetts legislature may have
assumed that personal principal could be expended for maintenance
and education, and although there may have been Massachusetts
case authority for that proposition, 23 7 it has been necessary in all
these states to amend the statutes to cover specifically the appli-
cation of personal principal for purposes of maintenance and educa-
tion. In 1844, just eight years after the adoption of the section
and six years after the provision had been copied into Michigan
law, Massachusetts amended this section to cover the application
232 Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97 (1808).
233 Whipple v. Dow, 2 Mass. 415 (1807).
2.34 See Buckworth v. Buckworth, I Cox 80, 29 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1784)
(though an allowance was not made because the child's property had
not yet vested, the court stated that "maintenance is given when the
father is not in such circumstances as to be able to give the child such
an education as is suitable to the fortune which he expects"); SIMpsoN,
INFANTS 202 (4th ed. 1926).
235 See, e.g., Hoste v. Pratt, 3 Ves. 730, 30 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1789).
2.36 See, e.g., Wellesley v. Beaufort (the Duke of), 2 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep.
236 (1827).
237 See Dawes v. Howard, 4 Mass. 97, 98 (1808): "The Court, after con-
sidering this cause, observed that, although, in England, guardians of
infants were not permitted to trench on the principal of the funds
belonging to their wards in any case, unless leave has been first given
by the chancellor, upon application to him, our statutes have altered the
law in this respect, and have even made the real estates of minors liable
to be sold for their support and education, when the personal estate shall
be insufficient."
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of personal principal.238  Michigan also amended this section in
1887.239 Wisconsin amended its version of section 38-503 in 1909240
and amended this section in 1933 to cover personal principal.24 1
(e) Sections 38-126 and 38-127.
In 1953, the Nebraska legislature added sections 38-126 and
38-127:242
The appointment of a guardian for a minor shall not relieve
his parent or parents or other persons liable for the support of
such minor from their obligation to provide for such minor. If
such persons are able to care for, maintain, and educate him, the
principal of his estate shall not be expended for any purpose except
as provided by sections 38-126 to 38-128.
Upon a proper showing to the court that the use of principal
of a minor's estate would be for the best interest of the ward,
considering all the circumstances of the ward and those liable
for his support, the court may from time to time authorize the
guardian to use so much of the principal of the estate of the minor
as it may deem proper, if it is also shown that (1) the income of
the estate of the minor and the financial ability of those liable
for the ward's support, maintenance, and education are insufficient
to properly support, maintain, and educate him in a manner com-
mensurate with his estate; (2) an emergency exists which justifies
an expenditure; or (3) a fund has been given to the ward for special
purpose and the court can, with reasonable certainty, ascertain such
purpose but, in such event, the principal may only be used for the
special purpose so ascertained.
The minutes of the legislative hearing24 3 and the legislative
committee report244 state only that the purpose of the enactment
was to make principal available for expenditure by a guardian
where the persons liable for support are unable to maintain the
minor. The legislature appears to have acted on the premise that
personal principal was not then expendable by a guardian for
support and education.
As late as 1953 there may have been no authority for a guardian
to expend personal principal (except for debts) even though real
238 Mass. Acts & Res. c. 88 (1844).
239 Mich. Acts No. 173, p. 181 (1887).
240 Wis. Laws c. 236, p. 255 (1909).
241 Wis. Laws c. 190, § 63 (1933).
242 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-126, 38-127 (Reissue 1960).
243 Minutes of Hearing by the Judiciary Committee on L.B. 299, March 4,
1953.
244 COMMITTEE REPORT oF mE JuDicmUxY Comi.vTTE oN L.B. 299, March 9,
1953 (on file in office of clerk of the Nebraska Legislature).
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estate could be sold in some situations. At least, the legislatures
of Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin had previously amended
their statutes to achieve this result. The County Court of Douglas
County, and probably other courts, also reached this conclusion.245
But if this was the result, it seems to have been the product of
historical accident rather than choice. On the theory that such a
paradox could not intentionally exist under the statutes, some
county courts were apparently permitting the expenditure of
guardianship principal for support and education purposes.2 46
To a degree, however, the enactment of sections 38-126 and
38-127 has continued a portion of the historical anomaly and added
a number of new problems.
1. The sections are applicable only to guardianships for minors.
This raises considerable doubt as to whether any of the other
statutes may now be construed to permit an application of per-
sonal property for purposes of support and education.2 47 In view of
the apparent legislative intent merely to provide an additional
power for guardians of minors, and the constitutional requirement
that statutes intended to be amended must be reenacted in the
amendatory measure,248 it would seem that the enactment of sec-
tions 38-126 and 38-127 did not change the then existing law under
the other statutes.
2. If sections 38-126 and 38-127 do not amend the other sections,
then it would not be necessary for a guardian using the power to
sell real estate provided in sections 38-503 or 38-601 to show that
personal principal has previously been expended under section
38-127. It is not clear, though, whether or not a guardian must show
as a prerequisite for his having authority under section 38-127 that
he has exhausted the property available under sections 38-503,
38-601 and 38-111.
There was no specific legislative purpose expressed that the
previously existing priority of application of guardianship funds
245 See Minutes of Hearing by the Judiciary Committee on L.B. 299, March
4, 1953 (on file in office of clerk of the Nebraska Legislature). This was
the reported opinion of Judge Robert R. Troyer, County Judge, Douglas
County.
246 See, e.g., 3 LIGHTNER, NEBRASKA FoRMs ANNOTATED § 3697 (2d ed. 1951).'
247 The question raised involves not only whether personal principal can be
applied under any other section under a guardianship for minors, but
also whether or not guardians for mentally ill or incompetent persons or
spendthrifts have these powers. Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-201.02, 38-306
(Reissue 1960).
248 NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.
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would be changed by the 1953 enactment. But if the legislature
meant to provide merely a power of sale which came into existence
only after all the other property then expendable had been ap-
plied,249 it would seem to be a condition precedent for an order under
section 38-127 that both income and real estate have been first ex-
pended under the other statutes (or, possibly, that a request for
such authority had been denied by the court).
The language of section 38-127 would not appear to require
this result. From the literal language of section 38-127, it would
now seem that a guardian may have authority under present law
to receive an order for selling either real estate or personal principal
without a showing that the other is unavailable for such expendi-
ture.
3. The language of section 38-126 is that if another person hav-
ing a duty of support is able to support the minor, "the principal
of his estate shall not be expended for any purpose except as pro-
vided by sections 38-126 to 38-128." In the light of its historical
development, the term "principal" would seem to relate only to
personal property. It would not appear to relate to the application
of real estate which is provided for in the other sections. Con-
ceivably, however, these sections could be construed as an addi-
tional grant of authority to expend real estate beyond the pur-
poses specified in the other sections. For example, section 38-127 (3)
might authorize an expenditure of real estate for a special purpose
for which the property was given to the ward, whereas this use
of real estate (or any guardianship income250 ) would not be per-
mitted under any other section.
4. Section 38-126 also provides that "The appointment of a
guardian for a minor shall not relieve his parent or parents or
other persons liable for the support of such minor from their obli-
gation to provide for such minor." This language does not mean
that the legislature necessarily acted on an assumption that a
mother had an obligation of support equal to that of a father, or
that another person had an obligation equal to that of either the
father or mother. It does seem to recognize that a mother has some
249 It may have been a strange quirk of the law, dating back to the original
Massachusetts statutes, that real estate, the historical favorite of the
common law which at one time could not even be levied for debts, was
required to be expended for support and education even though per-
sonal property could not be so used.
250 It is also strange that under the present statutes, the principal of a
fund given to a minor for a special purpose can be expended for the
special purpose, but that there is no statutory authorization for the
income of the fund to be so expended.
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legal obligation of support, however. The inherent difficulties in
defining the nature and extent of the legal obligations of support
of fathers, mothers and other persons under Nebraska law is dis-
cussed in a subsequent portion of this article.251 There is a residual
problem of conflict, however, between the enactment of sections
38-126 and 38-127 and the former law concerning the priority of
the various legal obligations of support. The question arises from
the fact that if the underlying legislative assumption was correct,
then, before 1953, guardianship personal principal was not ex-
pendable for purposes of support and education. After the applica-
tion of all income and real property, a mother or other persons,
who might not previously have had a support duty, would then
have had a legal obligation of support under other requirements
of Nebraska law.25 2 This order of priority would have meant that
the income and real estate would be first expended and then the
other support obligations would come into existence because guard-
ianship principal could not be expended. Although the above lan-
guage of section 38-126 literally purports to leave unchanged the
previously existing obligations of support, and although there is
no legislative history which indicates that any change in the priority
or definition of legal obligations of support was intended, it is
suggested that in some cases (at least under the pauper and crim-
inal law provisions), the enactment of sections 38-126 and 38-127
did change previously existing legal obligations of support.
(f) Summary.
In summary, the answers to many of the critical issues affect-
ing the use of income and principal by a guardian rest upon the
rather general inferences which can be drawn from these separate
Nebraska statutes. Most of the answers are not now clear under
Nebraska law. As a minimum, the fundamental issues of defining
the existence and priority of obligations of support, especially
those of a mother and a widow, and the priority of application of
guardianship income and principal (including real estate), should
be clarified by a comprehensive legislative revision of the present
sections. Fortunately, the present laws of Wisconsin, which were
251 See text at notes 288 to 331 infra.
252 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-101 (Reissue 1958). If guardianship principal
could not be expended for the minor, then he would apparently be a
"poor person, who shall be unable to earn a livelihood in consequence
of an unavoidable cause," and entitled to support under this section. See
also note 319 infra.
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thoroughly overhauled in 1933253 and also in 1957,254 may again
provide a suitable starting place for the formulation of Nebraska
legislation in this area.
F. TAX CONSEQUENCES.
(1) Guardianships.
An outright gift of property to a minor or his guardian results
in taxation of all future items of income and gain to the minor per-
sonally.255 The minor or his guardian or parent must file an income
tax return for the minor if the minor has gross income over $600.256
A parent providing more than half of the actual costs of support
can claim the child as a dependent although the child has gross
income over $600, and the child can continue to claim his own
personal exemption in his return, so long as the child is under
nineteen or a full time student.2 7
An outright gift (whether or not there is a guardian) qualifies
for the gift tax present interest annual exclusion 258 and becomes
a part of the minor's estate for federal estate tax and Nebraska
inheritance tax purposes. Since under Nebraska guardianship law
the property of a minor cannot be applied in such a way as to dis-
charge another's obligation of support,259 the outright gift would
not involve later tax consequences to anyone other than the minor.
(2) Custodianships.
The Gifts to Minors Act permits a custodian to expend property
for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor
"with or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other
person to support the minor or his ability to do So.11260 The cus-
todianship income is taxed to the minor except that it becomes
taxable to any other person whose support obligation is satisfied
253 Wis. Laws c. 190 (1933).
254 Wis. Laws c. 468 (1957). See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.01 to 319.71 (1958).
See also MicE. STAT. AxN. § 27.3178 (463) (1943).
255 Rev. Rul. 55-469, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 519.
256 See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.6012-1(a) (4), 1.6012-3(b) (3). See also INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 6201(c).
257 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 151(e), 152(a).
258 Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 319.
259 See notes 209, 218, 230 to 233, 241 supra.
260 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(2) (Reissue 1960).
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by the expenditure.261 A gift under the Act qualifies for the present
interest annual exclusion under the Internal Revenue Code.262
If the donor is custodian, the property remains a part of his
federal estate tax estate and Nebraska inheritance tax estate as
a power to alter or terminate.263 The Commissioner has apparently
yielded on some additional potential tax limitations, at least tem-
porarily. It would seem possible to view a transfer for one whom
the donor is legally obligated to support as a retained life interest
for estate tax purposes, 264 and the ability of a custodian other than
the donor to apply the property to the satisfaction of his own
legal obligation of support as a general power of appointment for
estate and gift tax purposes.265 Other than taxing the donor-cus-
todian on the basis of the power to alter or terminate, the custodial
property may become a part solely of the minor's estate tax estate.266
201 Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 23; Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum.
BuLL. 212.
262 Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 449; Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum.
BULL. 212.
263 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038; Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953);
Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 618; Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum.
BULL. 212; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2002(1) (b) & (c) (Reissue 1958).
264 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036. See Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871 (1953); LOWNDES &
YKAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXEs 145-147 (2d ed. 1962).
265 See Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2041-1(c) (1), 25.2514-1(c) (1): "A power of ap-
pointment exercisable for the purpose of discharging a legal obliga-
tion of the possessor or for his pecuniary benefit is considered a power
of appointment exercisable in favor of the possessor or his creditors."
It can be argued that since the custodianship statute refers to "the sup-
port, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor," the power is
not "limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, edu-
cation, support, or maintenance of the decedent" as specified in sec-
tions 2041(b) (1) (A) and 2514(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
The exercise or nonexercise of a power of appointment is not taxable
under the Nebraska Inheritance Tax. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2008.04 (Re-
issue 1958).
266 See Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 212, 213-4: "No taxable gift
occurs for Federal gift tax purposes by reason of a subsequent resigna-
tion of the custodian or termination of the custodianship .... The value of
property so transferred is includible in the gross estate of the donor
for Federal estate tax purposes if (1) the property is given in con-
templation of death within three years of the donor's death or (2) the
donor appoints himself custodian and dies while serving in that capacity.
... In all other circumstances custodial property is includible only in
the gross estate of the donee."; NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1003(1) (Reissue
1960).
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(3) Trusts.
Of the planning devices which make property available to
minors, trusts offer the widest variety of potential solutions to both
the donor's and donee's tax problems. An outright gift will remove
property from the donor's estate and result in future taxation to
the minor. In every situation, however, a trust can offer equivalent
or greater tax savings opportunities, and, in many cases, a number
of nontax advantages.
Guardianships and custodianships are arrangements for only
one beneficiary, normally involving the total legal ownership of
the property. Trusts may be employed to divide the ownership of
property into lesser components, present or future, and among a
number of individuals or entities. This offers a flexibility which
is needed in many instances to plan for a desired tax consequence,
as well as to achieve a desired ownership of the property. It per-
mits, for example, a short term trust for income tax savings to a
donor who cannot afford to part with the entire ownership of the
property, trusts which provide income to ages above or below the
age of twenty-one, interests which can enlarge, diminish or shift
on any specified contingency, trusts which sprinkle income among
a number of beneficiaries depending upon tax consequences, split-
ting capital gains from ordinary income if desired, and successive
ownership of property without estate taxation. The wide scope
for designing the ownership interests in a trust may also be used,
to a very considerable degree, to plan the incidence of taxation
from the interests in the trust.
Prior to 1954, there was considerable uncertainty as to the
circumstances in which a gift in trust for a minor would qualify
for the gift tax present interest annual exclusion of $3,000 per donee
(or $6,000 for a married couple claiming the split-gift privilege),
because of the legal incapacity of the minor.267 In 1954, section
2503 (c) was added to the Internal Revenue Code to provide that
a gift to a person under twenty-one (regardless of marital status)
is a gift of a present interest if it may be expended by or for the
benefit of the minor under twenty-one, and to the extent not so
expended will either pass to the donee at twenty-one or if the
minor dies under twenty-one be payable to the minor's estate or
as the minor may appoint under a general power of appointment.268
Section 2503 (c), then, permits a trust equivalent of an out-
right gift or custodianship for estate and gift tax purposes. It al-
267 For a summary of these cases see LOwNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXEs 726-729 (2d ed. 1962).
268 IxT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2503(c).
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lows property to be removed from the donor's estate tax estate
with a maximum use of the gift tax present interest exclusion.
There may be an income tax disadvantage from a trust if the
trust does not make any distributions to or for the minor and the
minor has no other taxable income. The minor, as an individual tax-
payer, has a $600 personal exemption whereas a "complex" trust
has only $100,269 and the minor can use the standard deduction
which is not allowed to a trust.270 This would mean that if there
was $1,000 in net income, the tax payable by a trust which made
no distribution to or for the minor would be $180, but if the same
$1,000 were earned by a guardianship or custodianship and the
minor had no other income, the tax would be only $60. Of course,
the trust could always achieve an identical tax result by distribut-
ing $1,000, and the balance of the property would still have the
advantages which flow from the trust device. The money need not
be distributed outright. It might be used to purchase life insurance
or government bonds, placed in a savings account in the minor's
name, used for items of "super-support" of the minor, or possibly
distributed to a custodian.27 1 It may be possible to make the trust
income taxable to the minor merely by giving the minor or his
guardian a power over the trust income or principal, whether or
not the minor is capable of exercising the power under state law
or a guardian is in fact ever appointed.2 7 2 The trust could even
reduce the total tax payable to just $42 by distributing just $900
(so as to make use of the trust's $100 exemption).
In estate planning where quite large amounts are involved,
trusts may actually provide an income tax advantage over cus-
todianships or guardianships for minors. A trust is treated as a
separate income taxpayer. Trust income and gain is taxable to
the beneficiaries or to the trust under the rules of distributable
net income. By carefully planned distributions, the trustee may
be able to split income for tax purposes between the trust and
2 6 9 
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 151(b), 642(b).
270 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 142(b) (4).
271 The custodianship statute does not now permit distributions from a trust
to a custodian, although the practice may presently exist in spite of the
lack of specific authorization. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1002 (Reissue
1960). The statute should be amended to provide that a trustee may be
permitted to make distributions to a custodian (who may also be the
trustee) for the minor. This situation illustrates the utility of such a
device.
272 Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 678; Trust No. 3 v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d
102 (7th Cir. 1961); note 281 infra.
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the minor in order to lessen the effect of progressive income tax
rates. 27 3 It may also be possible to create more than one trust to
utilize additional income taxpaying entities.
It should be noted, however, that any use of the trust property
in satisfaction of the grantor's,274 trustee's, 27 5 or another person's2
7 G
legal obligation of support results in the trust income being allo-
cated to that person for tax purposes. As in the case of custodian-
ships, the donor should not be a trustee of a section 2503 (c) trust,27 7
and there is considerable risk that in the case of a trust, the power
to apply trust property to one's own support obligation could con-
stitute a taxable general power of appointment for estate and gift
tax purposes.27 8 It is also necessary in drafting the trust instru-
ment to see that the donor does not retain any strings on the
dispositive arrangement, such as a power to replace the trustee.
Also, the income tax savings must be offset by what could be added
costs of a trust, especially a small trust intended only to make use
of the gift tax annual exclusion, and the additional administrative
duties, tax returns and reports.
The attitude of the Commissioner and the few cases to date
under section 2503 (c) indicate that even greater use of trusts for
minors may be permitted in the future. The regulations and revenue
rulings provide that a minor may be permitted to extend the term
of a section 2503 (c) trust beyond the age of twenty-one, so long
as the trust technically terminates at twenty-one and the action
of the minor in extending the term at twenty-one is roughly
equivalent to that of ownership of the property.27 9 While this is
273 For example, if there is $10,000 net income, the tax would be (a) $2,096
in a guardianship or custodianship, and (b) $2,606 if all taxed to the
trust, but (c) only $1,864 if $5,900 is distributed and $4,100 remains
taxable to the trust. The income accumulated before the beneficiary
attains age twenty-one is not subject to the accumulation distribution
rules when paid in a subsequent year. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 665 (b) (1).
27 4 
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 677 (b).
275 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 678(c).
276 Treas. Reg. § 1.662 (a) -4.
277 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038; Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
278 See Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2041-1(c) (1), 25.2514-1(c) (1) (set out in note 265
supra). There is a greater risk with trusts than custodianships, since
legal title is not in the minor.
279 Rev. Rul. 60-218, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 378-379: "The provisions of section
25.2503-4(b) (2) of the regulations are designed to permit the extension
of the term of the trust by the donee upon such conditions as he may
freely choose. This, of course, includes the right in the donee to extend
the term of the trust upon conditions therein set forth by the donor but,
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largely a matter of semantics (which might just as easily be con-
veyed in the case of an outright gift or custodianship), there could
be a substantial psychological impact on the minor to carry out
the full dispositive wishes of the donor for the trust property beyond
age twenty-one, apart from the technical legal rules.
The statute specifies that if the minor dies under age twenty-
one, the property must "be payable to the estate of the donee or
as he may appoint under a general power of appointment. 2 8 0 The
regulations indicate that it is sufficient that a minor possess a gen-
eral power of appointment over the property even though under
local property law, the power of appointment may not be exer-
cisable by a minor.2 81 The property subject to a general power of
appointment is probably a part of the minor's federal estate tax
in any event, the extension must be an act of the donee as absolute
owner of the property.... He must be given the unequivocal and un-
conditional right to receive the property without any necessity for af-
firmative action on his part. A power conferred, as in the instant case,
upon a donee to require immediate distribution of the property to him
upon attaining the age of 21 years does not meet the statutory require-
ment that the property must pass to him upon attaining the age of 21
years." But note that if the minor is treated as the owner of the
property at twenty-one, this could mean that for income tax purposes,
he becomes the "grantor" of the trust at that point and must comply
with the provisions of sections 671 to 677 if he does not wish to be
personally taxable for the trust income.
280 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2503 (c) (2) (B).
281 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b): "However, if the minor is given a power
of appointment exercisable during lifetime or is given a power of ap-
pointment exercisable by will, the fact that under the local law a
minor is under a disability to exercise an inter vivos power or to execute
a will does not cause the transfer to fail to satisfy the conditions of
section 2503 (c)." This is not really a concession on the Commissioner's
part. In most situations, the Commissioner will take the position that
the possession of a power over property makes the property includible
in the decedent's estate tax gross estate in spite of the fact that the
power may not have been exercisable by the decedent prior to death.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 384 (property subject to
general power of appointment includible even though donee of power
incompetent at all times from creation of power to date of death); Rev.
Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 151 (decedent possessed incidents of
ownership in insurance policy although he could not have practically
exercised the rights at the moment of his death). To maintain a con-
sistent position, it is necessary for the Commissioner to concede certain
other items, such as the qualification of property for the gift tax present
interest exclusion, above, and the qualification for the estate tax marital
deduction of property which is subject to a general power of appointment
which the donee is incompetent to exercise. See Rev. Rul. 55-518, supra.
But the Commissioner is not always willing to concede the point. See,
e.g., Trust No. 3 v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1960) (power of
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estate,28 2 although it would not be subject to the Nebraska inherit-
ance tax.2 3 A disposition giving the minor a general power of ap-
pointment has an advantage in being able to specify, according to the
regulations, a gift-over on default of an exercise of the power of ap-
pointment, even when the power cannot be exercised under local
minors over trust property for income tax purposes); LoWNDEs &
KRAamER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAxEs 725-729 (2d ed. 1962) (present
interest annual exclusion cases not covered by section 2503 (c)).
282 The statute defines a general power of appointment as one which is
"exercisable" in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or credi-
tors of his estate. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2041(b) (1), 2514(c). For
estate tax purposes, the Commissioner treats the taxable event as the
existence or possession of the power under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
2041 (a) (2) rather than a legal capacity to exercise the power. See Rev.
Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 384, 385: "Therefore, a person may have
a power without ever being able freely to exercise it. There is a
distinction between the existence of a power and the capacity to exer-
cise it. The taxable event is the possession at death of the power rather
than an exercise of the power." Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 Cum. BULL.
185; Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3 (b): "For example, if a decedent was given
a general power of appointment exercisable only after he reached a
certain age... the power would not be in existence on the date of the
decedent's death if the condition precedent to its exercise had not oc-
curred." Also, Rev. Rul. 55-518, and the authorities relied upon, seem
to assume that although the power could not be exercised by the
incompetent, it was exercisable by someone on her behalf. It is not
clear that, absent a provision in the trust instrument, anyone other than
the minor personally, even the court in a guardianship proceeding,
could exercise a general power of appointment on behalf of the minor
under Nebraska law. See notes 53 to 55 supra. See also Estate of Edel-
man, 38 T.C. No. 98 (Sept. 28, 1962): "Petitioner's position as to this is,
in substance: ... said power ceased to exist prior to her death because,
due to her mental condition during about the last 10 months of her life,
neither she nor any committee which might have been (but was not)
appointed for her, could have exercised such power. Hence, petitioner
argues that 'decedent's incompetency effected an involuntary relinquish-
ment of the power' under New York law. Petitioner has cited no New
York statute, and no decision either of any New York court or of any
other court, which supports his position, as applied to the instant case.
Moreover, as we have hereinabove found as a fact, Rebecca was never
adjudicated to be an incompetent; and no committee was ever appointed
for her .... [T]he fact that she became mentally deranged was, in the
absence of any adjudication of her incompetency and in the absence
of any appointment of a committee, not sufficient to eliminate or destroy
said valuable property right." Also note that INT. REV. CODE of 1954§ 2037(b) refers to "a general power of appointment (as defined in sec-
tion 2041) which in fact was exercisable immediately before the dece-
dent's death," giving apparent legislative acquiescence to the interpre-
tation that section 2041 includes general powers of appointment which
are not in fact exercisable at the time of death.
283 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2008.04 (Reissue 1958).
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law.284 Under a guardianship or custodianship, the heirs of the
minor, in most cases his parents, would inherit his property in the
event of his death under twenty-one. A gift-over in default of
appointment by the minor may be made under the trust instrument
(without necessity of becoming a part of the minor's probate estate)
directly to the desired ultimate beneficiaries. The property need
not return to the parents or other relatives whose estates would
otherwise be unnecessarily augmented by inheritance from the
minor.
Courts have supplied an even more surprising construction to
section 2503 (c). The statute provides that the "property and the
income therefrom" must be expendable for the minor and pass
to him or his estate or be subject to a general power of appoint-
ment. Several decisions have held that the trust estate may be
divided into separate "properties." So long as a particular "property"
and the income from that "property" pass to the minor at twenty-
one (or to his estate or is subject to a general power of appoint-
ment), that portion of the transfer qualifies for the present in-
terest exclusion. 2 5 In other words, if only the income passes to
the minor at twenty-one, the income share alone can qualify for
the gift tax exclusion. The "property" (i.e., the separate "property"
of income) and all of the income from the "property" (i.e., all of
the income from the income) will pass to the minor at twenty-one
or to his estate, or be subject to a general power of appointment if
he dies under twenty-one.
For the present, estate planners should probably not rely on
these apparent extensions of the literal language of section 2503 (c)
unless it is the only means to achieve important estate planning re-
sults, and only then with some warning to the client as to the risk
284 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (3).
285 Commissioner v. Herr, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C.
732 (1961); Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961); Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C.
No. 79 (Sept. 10, 1962). But see LowNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE &
GiFT TAXES 723 (2d ed. 1961): "The reasoning in the Herr and Konner
cases appears to be more ingenious than persuasive and it would not
be surprising to see the cases reversed on appeal. If they are sustained,
they offer an interesting opportunity for making a gift to a minor
which will qualify as a gift of a present interest under Section 2503 (c),
even though the donated property is kept out of the minor's hands
after he attains 21. In this connection it should be noted, however,
that the present interest which will qualify for the exclusion will be
the discounted value of the income from the trust property during the
beneficiary's minority, rather than the entire trust property, which is
ordinarily treated as a present interest when a transfer qualifies under
Section 2503 (c)."
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of litigation and possible adverse tax consequences. 280 The present
trends do, however, offer an indication that there may be a con-
tinued lessening of a major tax objection to the use of trusts for
minors--loss of the present interest exclusion.
It should also be noted that section 2503 (c) is not the only
means of securing the present interest exclusion. The same meth-
ods by which the exclusion can be utilized in the case of an adult,
such as a current right to income, are still available in planning
trusts for minors.28 7 In some situations, it may be useful to forgo
qualifying all or part of the gift for the present interest exclusion
in order to achieve income or estate tax objectives. This is cer-
tainly true where the total gifts in any calendar year exceed the
amount of the annual exclusion. Only under trust planning is it
possible to consider the comparative tax consequences of alternative
dispositions, since only there does the draftsman have an ability
to regulate the dispositive arrangement and, with it, the tax results.
G. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN DEFINING "SUPPORT".
The primary significance an obligation of support assumes in
estate planning and property management for minors is in con-
nection with federal taxation. The payment or application of funds
from a custodianship or trust constitutes taxable income to a per-
son whose legal obligation of support is satisfied by the expendi-
ture.28 8 A gift in trust to a person whom the donor is legally obli-
gated to support may not remove the property from the donor's
estate or be a completed gift under the federal estate and gift
taxes.
28 9
Perhaps the most expositive tax statement defining what is
meant by an obligation of support is contained in the income tax
regulations: 290
Any amount which, pursuant to the terms of a will or trust instru-
ment, is used in full or partial discharge or satisfaction of a legal
286 See LOwDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXES 812-816 (2d ed.
1962).
287 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(c): "Thus, for example, a transfer of property
in trust with income required to be paid annually to a minor beneficiary
and corpus to be distributed to him upon his attaining the age of 25 is
a gift of a present interest with respect to the right to income but is a
gift of a future interest with respect to the right to corpus."
288 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 677(b), 678(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a) -4.
289 For a discussion of these issues, see LowNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE
& GIFT TAXEs 145-147 (estate tax), 687-689 (gift tax) (2d ed. 1962).
290 Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4.
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obligation of any person is included in the gross income of such
person . . .as though directly distributed to him as a beneficiary
.... The term "legal obligation" includes a legal obligation to
support another person if, and only if, the obligation is not affected
by the adequacy of the dependent's own resources. For example, a
parent has a "legal obligation" within the meaning of the preceding
sentence to support his minor child if under local law property or
income owned from property by the child cannot be used for his
support so long as his parent is able to support him. On the other
hand, if under local law a mother may use the resources of a child
for the child's support in lieu of supporting him herself, no obliga-
tion of support exists within the meaning of this paragraph, whether
or not income is actually used for support .... In any event, the
amount of trust income which is included in the gross income of a
person obligated to support a dependent is limited by the extent of
his legal obligation under local law. In the case of a parent's obliga-
tion to support his child, to the extent that the parent's legal obliga-
tion of support, including education, is determined under local law
by the family's station in life and by the means of the parent, it is
to be determined without consideration of the trust income in
question.
Treating this regulation as being a correct interpretation of the
law, and as expressing a rule which carries over to the other
present federal tax provisions dependent upon the existence and
extent of a support obligation, neither of which assumptions may
be correct,291 still does not provide a sufficient working basis for
effective estate planning or management.
The "legal obligation" apparently need not be a "legally en-
291 Compare Tomlinson, Support Trusts and Gifts to Minors, 97 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 929-31 (1958) (Report of A.B.A. Subcommittee on Estate and
Tax Planning): "There is some doubt whether this extreme position
of the Treasury will be sustained, for the prior court decisions have in-
volved either grantors who had legal obligations or beneficiary-trustees
with unfettered command over income .... Possibly the doctrine has
been pushed too far in the case of support trusts. It seems reasonable
that, where the person legally obligated to support the beneficiary is
the grantor of the trust, he should be taxed with the income which is
used to relieve him of his obligation and which but for the creation
of the trust would be his and taxable to him. Perhaps the same prin-
ciple is applicable where the obligor is the trustee of a trust created by
another, or has the right (even though he is not the trustee) to control
the application of its income. Where, however, a third person creates
a trust for the benefit of one toward whom someone has an obligation
of support, and the obligor has no voice in determining what amount of
income is used for the beneficiary, it may be regarded as inequitable and
possibly unconstitutional to tax him with income so used, or at least with
any amount of income so used beyond that required for minimal support
of the beneficiary. Since the trust does not provide the obligor with
any funds with which to pay the tax falling upon him, it could be argued
that he should not bear a tax burden on moneys used for anything but
bare necessities.", with Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal Taxa-
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forceable" obligation. There is no reported Nebraska decision per-
mitting an independent suit by a minor for support and maintenance
where the family has remained united.292 Nevertheless, the apparent
meaning of this regulation and the other regulations and code pro-
visions referring to support is that the obligation must be imposed
by law as distinguished from one arising out of moral or social
pressures. It could be argued that a proper federal tax policy would
pin the federal tax consequences to the satisfaction of the moral or
social obligations which an individual has objectively established
for himself and his family, as well as the legally-imposed obliga-
tions, especially where the donor is either the transferor of the
property or its trustee, but the present tax code does not seem
validly susceptible to this construction. 293
tion: A Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 53 (1956) (quoted in note
293 infra). For a comprehensive study, see Note, Federal Tax Aspects
of the Obligation to Support, 74 HInv. L. REV. 1191 (1961).
292 Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-101 (Reissue 1958) (providing that any poor
person unable to earn a livelihood may bring an action in his own behalf
for support under the pauper statutes, discussed in notes 319 and 320
infra); McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) (dis-
cussed in text at note 326 infra).
293 For a very forceful argument to the contrary, as to how the present
statutes should be applied, see Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal
Taxation: A Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 53, 61-65 (1956). "The
function, or at least the potential function, of the family support obliga-
tion in federal taxation must be to preserve the economic unity of the
family and thus protect the progressive rate structures of income and
transfer taxes against divisive schemes designed to splinter the family-
for tax purposes only. To look too seriously or too long to a local law
concept in this effort to make the progressive rate operate with uni-
formity could, in military parlance, only be described as an advance to
the rear. Perhaps the outstanding characteristics of the local law family
support obligation is its non-uniformity, its variation from state to state.
... The fact is that there is little or no local law of a definitive nature
on the subject of the nature or extent of the family support obligation
while the family is united.... Of course, in cases involving transfers
for support incident to divorce or separate maintenance, the courts
do exercise some authority and the standards announced in such cases,
vague as they may be, can serve as an appropriate reference in deter-
mining, especially for estate and gift tax purposes, whether the trans-
fer for support is really what it claims to be.... What is important to
the present subject, the taxation of the family united, is recognition that
the duty to support the integrated family is a curious sort of unliquidated
obligation which in its nature and extent is more societal and moral
than legally enforceable. The tax cases that have considered the matter
do recognize the facts of life. While paying lip service to the 'debt pay-
ment' theory of Douglas v. Willcuts, they charge the grantor with his
own decision on what is needed for family support and tax him on
all trust income so earmarked. This, of course, is a long step in the
direction of recognition that support trusts generate taxable income
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If there has been a bonafide state court determination of a
support obligation of a parent, as by an award of a divorce court,
guardianship determination, or construction of a trust instrument,
the determination becomes binding for federal tax purposes in that
matter.294 At least, any satisfaction of the judicial obligation would
constitute the satisfaction of a legal obligation which is a taxable
event apart from the issue of support.2
95
The tax regulation specifically leaves a number of items to
state law. Its purport is that local law defining the obligation of
support controls the federal tax consequences, both as to the ex-
istence of the support obligation and as to the extent of the obliga-
tion. The regulation refers to the existence of an obligation to
support, especially possible differences between the support obliga-
tions of a father and mother. It also leaves to state law such
questions as whether education is a phase of support, and whether
the support obligation, once it attaches, is measured by the adequacy
of the dependent's own resources and by the family's station in life.
There are many circumstances in which Nebraska law might
be called upon to define a support obligation with respect to minors
apart from the federal tax situation: the expenditure of or reim-
bursement from guardianship funds,20 6 divorce, separation and
annulment child support awards, 29 7 interpretation of a trust, will
or other legal instrument employing this language,298 criminal
under section 61 not on the 'debt payment' theory but by discharging
the grantor's societal obligation of family support. Further steps by the
Treasury and the courts on the family support front are required, how-
ever, if the progressive rate structure is to be evenly applied."
294 Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determinations, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 1350 (1959). One interesting application of this rule is that since
under Nebraska law the support obligation of a father under a divorce
decree may continue after the death of the father, the estate of the
father (or other entity subject to court decree) might become an income
tax beneficiary upon satisfaction of its obligation under the decree.
295 See Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). Similarly, a parent may be
taxable on trust income used to pay a note or contract which the parent
has signed for a child.
2906 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-111, 38-126, 38-127, 38-503 (Reissue 1960), 38-601
(Supp. 1961).
297 E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 42-310 ("suitable maintenance during the pend-
ency of such suit, as shall be deemed proper and necessary and for the
benefit of the children"), 42-311 ("such further decree as it shall deemjust and proper concerning the care, custody, and maintenance of the
minor children of the parties") (Reissue 1960).
298 See, e.g., In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943) (trust
instrument provided expenditure for "the proper use, support and main-
tenance of said son ... as his needs may require or necessitate"); Wil-
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support statutes2 9 or the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act,3 0 0 paternity cases,30 1 Lord Campbell's Act cases on behalf
of minors,0 2 negligence suits by parents against third parties for
injuries to the child,3 03 decedent's estates for allowances during the
first year of administration 0 4 or until certain children reach
seven 3 5 or fourteen30 6 years of age, the pauper and state assistance
laws,30 7 in contract suits for necessaries furnished to the minor 0 s
and undoubtedly other situations.
liams v. Williams, 168 Neb. 135, 95 N.W.2d 205 (1959) (separation agree-
ment, incorporated by reference in divorce decree, to "provide suitably
for the support, maintenance and education" of daughter).
299 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-446 (abandonment and willful neglect to maintain
and provide for wife and minor child); 28-449 (willful failure, refusal
or neglect to provide "proper food, clothing, shelter, or in case of sick-
ness to care for his wife, wife and minor child, or minor child, or de-.
pendent minor stepchild") (Reissue 1956); 28-477 (neglect of child
under 18) (Supp. 1961).
300 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-704, 42-707 (Reissue 1960); Rice v. Rice, 165
Neb. 778, 87 N.W.2d 408 (1958).
301 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-102, 13-106, 13-108 (Reissue 1954).
302 See, e.g., Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 94 N.W.2d 12,13 (1959) (syllabus
by the court): "A presumption of pecuniary loss exists in favor of one
legally entitled to service or support from one killed by the wrongful
act of another.... Where a presumption of pecuniary loss obtains from
the relationship and a legal liability to support, the extent of the pecuni-
ary loss must be left to the good judgment and common sense of the
jury after it has considered all the evidence and circumstances in the
case tending to fix the sum that will make full compensation for the
loss sustained."
303 For example, a parent may be entitled to recover any increased ex-
penses in the maintenance of the minor, in addition to other items of
pecuniary loss. See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 91 (1935). But, arguably,
the parent is not entitled to recover in his own right for increased costs
of support, maintenance and education above his legal obligation to
supply those items to the minor.
304 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-103(2) ("such reasonable allowance ...as the
county court shall judge necessary for their maintenance during the
progress of the settlement of the estate, according to their circum-
stances"), 30-229 (Reissue 1956).
305 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1301 (Reissue 1956) ("necessary expenses of the
support").
300 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-103 (3) ("necessary maintenance of such children"),
30-229 (Reissue 1956).
307 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 68-101 et seq. (Reissue 1958), 43-401 et seq. (Re-
issue 1960).
3108 See 2 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 244 (3d ed. 1959):. "What are necessaries
is determined not simply by the nature of the thing, but by the need
of that thing at that time by the infant in question. Accordingly, if an
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The federal tax law does not attempt to specify what portion
of Nebraska law is relevant to a determination of the tax issues
of support of a minor. Presumably, the entire law becomes signifi-
cant under the "legal obligation" theory, since the satisfaction of
any legal obligation, however imposed, carries with it the tax
consequence.
(1) Existence Of The Obligation.
The original common law concept that a father's duty to support
his children was merely that of an imperfect moral obligation has
developed into the full scale present legal duty to support. There
are so many aspects of the total legal obligation of support owed
by a father that it seems doubtful under Nebraska law that any
voluntary act of the father or other person could extinguish a
father's legal obligation of support.3 9 In fact, even a divorce decree
making a child support award does not extinguish the father's legal
support obligation.310
infant is already supplied either by his guardian or by previous pur-
chases, with sufficient food, clothing, or other necessaries, no further
purchase on credit of articles of the same kind can bind him. Therefore,
whether a minor is living with a parent or guardian who is capable of
supplying him with necessaries is a fact vital for determining whether
a particular contract made by him is for necessaries. The presumption
is that the infant's wants are sufficiently met, and the court will not
substitute the judgment of a jury for that of a parent or guardian unless
the discretion of the latter has clearly been abused." Cf. In re Estate
of Davenport, 140 Neb. 769, 2 N.W.2d 17 (1942).
309 There is apparently no judicial precedent on the issue whether a parent's
support obligations may be eliminated by an actual provision for sup-
port of the minor by some other means. At most, the support obliga-
tion would be eliminated only to the extent of the other property avail-
able for support, and would immediately reappear when that property
is exhausted. If this is true, then there would seem to be no public
policy against such an arrangement, as is sometimes applied to invalidate
contractual releases of support rights between spouses, because the
minor would be adequately cared for and would not become a public
charge. The transfer undoubtedly would not be conclusive as to the
support obligation in the event of a subsequent divorce, and would have
a questionable effect in a number of other situations such as the dam-
ages resulting from the wrongful death of the father or support allow-
ances to be made from the father's estate. All in all, it would seem from
an extremely gross reading of the statutes, cases and public policies con-
cerning support of minors that there would continue to be a residual
legal duty to support owed by a father even after the transfer of property
for the mandatory support of a minor under Nebraska law, but that
the lesser obligations owed by other persons, including a mother, could
be totally extinguished by such an arrangement.
310 See, e.g., Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 229, 230, 95 N.W.2d 545, 547 (1959)
(syllabus by the court): "The fact that the marriage relation is dis-
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It may be important for federal tax planning purposes to con-
sider whether a legal obligation of support can be extinguished
under Nebraska law. Theoretically, it can be argued that a father's
support obligations under Nebraska law might be extinguished, or
temporarily extinguished, by trust provisions which mandatorily
require the expenditure of trust funds for support of the minor.
If so, then presumably the father would have no existing legal
support obligation at the subsequent time when the trust funds are
actually expended for the minor's support; and the father would,
therefore, not be taxable on the income used for the minor's support.
Admittedly, if the trust did not compel the support of the minor,
the father's support obligation would remain at the time of ex-
penditure. And an outright gift of property, or a gift to a custodian
for a minor, would not extinguish the father's obligation of support.
There is no general support obligation by a mother to a proper-
tied child equal to that owed by a father. A mother has a statutory,
independently enforceable, obligation to support a child under the
paupers statute,31 ' and the criminal statutes may impose some legal
obligation on her to support her child where she has the means for
support.312
There has been a legislative assumption, as the guardianship
statutes have been amended, that a mother does have some general
support obligation toward her child, at least insofar as the guardian-
ship property is concerned.31 3 The best interpretation which can be
drawn from the maze of existing guardianship law in Nebraska
is that a mother's support obligation commences for guardianship
purposes after the father's property has been expended and after
the guardianship income has been applied for purposes of support,
maintenance and education.314 In other words, the priority of a
solved does not relieve the father of the duty to support his minor
children."
311 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 68-101, 68-102 (Reissue 1958).
312 Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-446 (abandonment and willful neglect), 28-449
(Reissue 1956) (willful failure, refusal or neglect), 28-477 (Supp. 1961)
(neglect or contributing to neglect). These provisions contemplate
only items of bare subsistence. The death of a child due to the mother's
failure to support could constitute murder or manslaughter depending
upon her state of mind. But, unlike a father, a mother probably cannot
be required to go to work to provide funds for the child's support,
even though the literal language of sections 28-449 and 28-477 might
seem to infer that she could. Lacking the means of support, her sole
duty would be to notify welfare or official agencies.
313 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-126 (Reissue 1960) (enacted in 1953, dis-
cussed in text at notes 242 to 252 supra).
314 See text at note 252 supra.
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mother's support obligation would be following the father and
guardianship income, but before the guardianship principal. This
answer is not clear from the statutes, but it is a matter which easily
can and should be amended by the Legislature. As clarified, these
rules should be determinative for federal tax purposes as to the
existence of a mother's support obligation towards minors.
Also, we might assume for estate planning purposes that a
divorced wife or widow could have a more extensive support obliga-
tion than that of a mother in a united family. There is no definite
authority for such a premise, but it is possible to generalize that
there has been an implied assumption to this effect in some of the
reported decisions. 315 It could be that ultimately the divorced wife
or widow will be subject to the same obligation as that of a father
in a united family.
There are also support obligations owed under Nebraska law
by adoptive parents,316 stepfathers and stepmothers, 317 and other
persons in loco parentis.318 In some situations, even though the
minor is the beneficiary of property being held for him, a support
obligation may be owed by a grandfather, grandmother, child,
brother or sister.319
With respect to the support obligations of persons other than
the father, it seems possible that a transfer for the mandatory
support of a minor would be held to extinguish the legal obligation
315 See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 107 N.W.2d 407 (1961);
Bize v. Bize, 154 Neb. 520, 48 N.W.2d 649 (1951).
316 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-110 (Reissue- 1960) (after adoption the same rights,
duties and other legal consequences exist as between a natural parent
and child).
317 See Fischer v. Fischer, 106 Neb. 477, 184 N.W. 116 (1921). See also NEB.
REv. STAT. § 28-449 (Reissue 1956).
318 See Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946) (syllabus by
the court): "A person standing in loco parentis to a child is one who
has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relation, without going through the
formalities necessary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and
liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful parent."
310 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-101 (Reissue 1958). This statute permits an
independent suit for support by a "poor person, who shall be unable to
earn a livelihood in consequence of an unavoidable cause." In a situa-
tion where property is being held for a minor but can be applied for
his benefit only in the discretion of someone else, the exercise of which
discretion is beyond the power of a court to compel in favor of the minor,
the minor would continue to be a "poor person," the support obliga-
tions of others toward him as a "poor person" would continue, and any
satisfaction of that obligation would result in potential income tax liabil-
ity to the person whose legal obligation under the statute was satisfied.
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of support under Nebraska law.3 20 If so, in addition to the issue
whether this determination would be given effect for federal in-
come tax purposes, there are the questions whether the transfer
of property is for a good and valuable consideration under the
federal estate and gift tax laws.3 21 Treating the transfer in satis-
faction of one's own legal obligation of support as being for a good
and valuable consideration would mean that the transfer might
not be subject to the gift tax to the extent of the consideration, and
arguably (but probably not successfully) not a part of the trans-
feror's federal estate tax estate. In any event, this is the sort of an
approach which should be utilized for estate planning purposes
only when necessary to achieve some significant result. Apart from
the practical effect of the literal language of the income tax regula-
tion purporting to leave the federal tax consequences to state law
determinations, the device might fall under the ever-expanding
rule that for federal tax purposes substance controls over mere
form.
(2) Extent Of The Obligation.
It may well be that, as a practical matter, state law is merely
persuasive authority of, but not conclusive in determining, the
extent of a support obligation for federal tax purposes; and that
the best tax policy would be to apply a uniform federal definition
of support for federal tax purposes.322 The income tax regulation
320 The operation of NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-101 (Reissue 1958), discussed in
note 319 supra, clearly illustrates this proposition. If a minor has prop-
erty which is sufficient for his maintenance and support, he would not
be a "poor person" under the statute and no other person vould be
legally obligated thereunder for his support. Similarly, where trust
property is required to be used for the support of a minor, and is suf-
ficient in amount, there would not seem .to be any legal obligation of
support on the part of any person, except possibly his father, to the
extent of the minor's bwn property. One consequence of this reasoning,
however, is that for federal tax purposes the person whose future legal
obligation is discharged by such a transfer might continue to be treated
as the donee of the property or income in subsequent years despite the
technical absence of, or elimination of, any formal legal obligation of
support with respect to the future years.
321 See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAxEs 145-147, 687-689
(2d ed. 1962).
322 See, e.g., Note, Federal Tax Aspects of the Obligation To Support, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1221 (1961): "But on the question of the extent of
the support obligation, state law does not appear even today to be
determinative, notwithstanding the lip service which is generally paid
to it by the Commissioner and the courts. At best, state law seems
to impose a slight restraint on the Commissioner. Yet, by talking as if
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and present tax theory, however, operate on the satisfaction of a
legal obligation concept which limits the federal tax consequences
to "the extent of his legal obligation under state law." The guardi-
anship analogy is the best source of Nebraska law available to
determine the continuing substantive support obligation once it
attaches, in the absence of actual adjudication. Historically, these
rules have grown up with regard to a propertied child, the precise
situation involved for federal tax purposes. If the issues of a legal
obligation to support a propertied child can arise at all under
Nebraska law so long as the family is harmonious, they are most
likely to be determined in a guardianship setting.
An interpretation of state law for the purpose of determining
the federal tax consequences will in virtually every case be an
imagined, or hypothetical, application of a relatively uncertain and
pliable body of state law to the operative facts. So long as one is
required to make a guess as to the extent of a support obligation
under state law, the most relevant guess would seem to be how
the issue might be resolved in a guardianship setting. If the guardi-
anship funds could have been applied in the situation involved,
then the expenditure would not, under the rules discussed above,
involve the satisfaction of a legal obligation of supporting the
minor. If the guardianship funds could not have been applied to
the transaction, an additional determination must be made whether
the probable reason is that the payment would have been (a) in
satisfaction of the support obligation of another person within the
guardianship framework, or (b) that it involved matters outside
the guardianship provisions for "support, maintenance, and educa-
tion."
Granted that this hypothetical application of the guardianship
law is subject to the logical fallacy of "begging the question," still,
if state law is to be used, some analogy must be drawn.323 The
relevant factors which can come into play to determine the ex-
penditure of guardianship funds are the most meaningful tools
which are available under present Nebraska law. At least, the
state law were controlling, the Commissioner and the courts have
probably generated some confusion. This confusion and the lack of
uniformity inherent in a reference to state law could be dispelled by a
candid assertion that taxation is to be based on an independent federal
standard."; Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal Taxation: A
Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 53 (1956) (quoted in note 293
supra).
323 Since any recasting of the facts for federal tax purposes is admittedly
hypothetical, the substance of the entire family situation rather than
the mere transactional form should be used in applying the analogy.
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guardianship rules have developed with respect to the precise situa-
tion of a propertied child, and normally within a united family.
The divorce cases, however, offer the most numerous and com-
plete Nebraska law concerning the extent of a duty to support minor
children. But these rules involve a divided family. Under Nebraska
law, the divorce court exercises general equitable jurisdiction to
"make such further decree as it shall deem just and proper con-
cerning the care, custody, and maintenance of the minor children
of the parties. '324 This involves a full range of judicial discretion
to make an award for the child's best interests based upon all of the
circumstances of the case, and not merely to enforce what the
father's legal obligations might be apart from the divorce. -3 2  At
this point, the ordinary social policy against judicial intrusion into
family support matters in the interests of preserving domestic
harmony is significantly reduced.
The fact that the father will normally be separated from his
children in divorce situations, and not entitled to custody or earn-
ings and services of the child, may also tend to distinguish the
divorce cases. Divorce law contains an element of fault which may
influence support awards as a practical matter, whether explicit
or not. If, in a specific situation where the family is divided, the
rules of divorce and separation would more accurately reflect the
existing family picture, there is no reason why they cannot be
applied to that case. But, where the family is happily united, there
is likely to be a closer factual analogy to the guardianship rules than
to the divorce rules.
The questionable obligation of a father for federal tax purposes
324 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-311 (Reissue 1960).
325 See, e.g., Koser v. Koser, 148 Neb. 277, 27 N.W.2d 162 (1947): (syllabus
by the court): "The disposition of minor children and provision for their
support in an action wherein a divorce is granted is not controllable
by agreement of the parties but by the court on the facts and circum-
stances as disclosed to it." A father's obligation to pay a stated monthly
sum survives his death. Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d
212 (1957). The court will consider the standard of living previously
set by a father in making the award. See, e.g., Cowan v. Cowan, 160 Neb.
74, 69 N.W.2d 300 (1955); York v.York, 138 Neb. 224, 292 N.W. 385 (1940).
There has been no detailed listing of factors which should be taken
into consideration in making child support awards as in the case of
alimony or the division of property. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Waldbaum,
171 Neb. 625, 107 N.W.2d 407 (1961). Child support awards are ap-
parently left to general judicial discretion to determine the reasonable
needs of the minor from all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 173 Neb. 880, 882, 115 N.W.2d 462, 463 (1962):
"It is the continuing duty of the court to consider the reasonable needs
of the children and the ability of the father to supply those needs."
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to provide a private school, vocational or college education for his
children illustrates a probable difference in result between ap-
proaching the problem of the extent of the duty to educate under
Nebraska law from the standpoint of a united or divided family.
Under the existing state of the law, a county court would appear
to be justified in authorizing (with, of course, complete procedural
formality) guardianship income and principal to be expended for
private school, vocational or college education where the parents,
although of sufficient means, refused to provide this education.
Apart from the issue of whether a minor or someone on his
behalf could maintain an independent suit for support under the
inherent equity power of district courts, it seems very likely that
the court would find in such a separate proceeding, if entertainable,
that education beyond the public school level is a discretionary
and desirable moral duty, but substantively not a part of the
required support obligation within a united family. The same
considerations would be present in this determination as those
which underlie the leading decision in McGuire v. McGuire.326
Technically, this decision stands for no more than that a wife can-
not recover separate maintenance in equity while residing with
her husband, because of the existence of statutory provisions deal-
ing with other aspects of separate maintenance. The crux of this
decision, from a policy standpoint, however, is to permit broad dis-
cretion to a husband in a united family as to the support level of
the family. Even if the suit could be maintained, the reasoning
of the opinion would indicate that a father would have a residual
discretion to determine what educational expenditures, if any,
should be made beyond the public school level.
Where a husband and wife are divorced or legally separated,
there is a clearly enforceable obligation of a father of sufficient
means to provide a private, vocational or college education for his
unemancipated minor children. This matter is within the discre-
tion of the divorce court based upon all of the circumstances of
the case.
In a number of reported opinions, divorce and separation
awards have included education costs beyond those of the public
schools. 327 The legal obligation of a father to support his children
326 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953), noted in 33 NEB. L. REV. 103 (1953).
See Annot., Maintenance of Suit by Child, Independently of Statute,
Against Parent for Support, 13 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1950).
327 See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 107 N.W.2d 407 (1961)
(in the absence of unusual circumstances, father has no duty to provide
college education beyond minority, but implies that during minority
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continues after the decree of divorce.328 The initial decree can be
modified for changed circumstances, or if it is in the best interests
of the children on the court's own motion, or on the petition of
either parent.329 If the issue of support has not been adjudicated
in the original proceeding, the mother may maintain an independent
suit in equity against the father for support of the children.3 1
Thus, in the case of a divorce, there are clearly enforceable
rights which do not exist in the absence of divorce. The whole
crux of the present federal tax theory flows from the satisfaction
of a legal obligation of support as defined under state law. This
should mean that under Nebraska law there is no legal duty for
federal tax purposes to educate beyond the public schools where
the family is united. To imply such a duty for federal tax purposes
would go beyond the purported theory of satisfaction of a legal
obligation. It would also seem to be a gross misconstruction of the
operative facts to assume a hypothetical divorce for a united family.
Further, there is no clear United States Supreme Court authority
for extension of the income tax consequences beyond the "satisfac-
tion of a legal obligation" theory under the present Internal Revenue
Code, and an attempt to alter the basic tax policy in this regard
might run into constitutional objections.
both divorced father and mother may have such an obligation); Bize
v. Bize, 154 Neb. 520, 48 N.W.2d 649 (1951) (increased allowance under
divorce decree to allow son, who had previously been in trouble, to
attend military academy until he graduated, became twenty-one, or
entered military service, infers that, on the facts involved, both parents
had such a legal obligation toward the child); Yost v. Yost, 143 Neb.
80, 8 N.W.2d 686 (1943) (divorce decree affirmed requiring father to
pay in addition to other specified amounts "all of the expenses of edu-
cating the minor daughter, including tuition, school supplies, transporta-
tion, board and room, with the expense incurred in membership in
sororities or other school organizations, and in addition . . . the reason-
able expense of vacations of said minor daughter"); Ruehle v. Ruehle,
161 Neb. 691, 74 N.W.2d 689 (1956) (nurse's training and university
education impliedly treated as within divorce decree support obligation
for purposes of decision on other issues); Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb.
850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906) (out-state private school); cf. Blue v. Blue, 152
Neb. 82, 40 N.W.2d 268 (1949) (father of very modest means not required
to send self-supporting daughter to two years of college so she couldqualify as an airline hostess); Dimond v. State, 110 Neb. 519, 194 N.W.
725 (1923) (implying that under some circumstances not present in
that case, a college student might be within the criminal support stat-
utes). See also Annot., Education as Element in Allowance For Benefit
of Child in Decree of Divorce or Separation, 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957).
328 See Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 229, 95 N.W.2d 545 (1959).
329 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-312 (Reissue 1960).
330 Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918).
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On the basis of existing Nebraska law, it might be expected
that guardianship proceedings would limit expenditures to those
which are really needed to maintain the minor to age twenty-one
when the property becomes his free from limitation. A divorce
court might give more effect to the family's station in life. A
guardianship might reflect more fully the contemporaneous wishes
of the minor's parents with regard to his maintenance and education.
In either case, the previous habits of the parents, the amount,
character and availability of the minor's property, and the means
of the parents, are factors to be taken into consideration, but with-
out any specific weight assigned to them. Having to make one total
generalization from state law as to whether a support obligation
hypothetically exists in any particular case, the most opportune
vantage point is that of the Nebraska Supreme Court in resolving
a guardianship case.
In addition, if state law is to control these important federal
tax considerations, then the Nebraska statutes should be clarified,
if not substantively amended. A revision of the guardianship
statutes concerning the application of principal and income which
has been suggested above should then have the additional incidental
effect of clarifying the federal tax consequences which flow from a
Nebraska support obligation toward a minor.
It is possible for an estate planner to minimize the risks of
adverse or unexpected tax consequences arising from support
obligations. Some of the existing tools which might be used are
to accumulate the income in the trust or custodianship; place the
income in a savings account in the minor's name, or purchase
government bonds or life insurance with the income; draft the
trust instrument to limit the use of trust funds by specific language
to non-support obligation items; expend trust or custodianship funds
for items clearly beyond the ordinary support range, being cautious
to record the actual provision of support by the person having a
legal obligation; and use a mother rather than a father as trustee
or custodian.331 In any event, the person whose support obligation
331 In addition to the authorities cited in note 291 supra, see Ehrlich, The
Effective Use of Support Trusts: Trusts for Minors, Custodian Statutes,
Gifts of Future Interests, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 729 (1961);
Savage, Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Support Trusts
and Uniform Gifts to Minors Statute Gifts; What Constitutes Support
for Tax Purposes, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1097 (1959); McIntire,
Practical Questions on Gifts to Minors, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 320 (1958);
Goodson, When Is Payment in Discharge of Parent's Legal Obligation?,
99 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 17 (1960); Lauritzen, Super Support Trusts-Or
How to Set Up a Trust To Pay Income to Minor Children Without Tax-
ing the Income to the Settlor, 1 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. (No.2) 1 (June 1957) ;
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is in fact satisfied by the expenditure would normally be no worse
off financially after the expenditure than if it had not been made.
H. LIABILITY FOR GENERAL DEBTS OF MINOR.
Guardianship3 3 2 and custodianship 33 property is subject to the
claims of creditors. The assets of a Nebraska trust can be placed
beyond creditor's claims by a provision in the trust instrument.33 4
From the standpoint of insuring the intended disposition, it would
seem that a clause of this type should be included as a matter of
routine in trust instruments.33 3
Bronston, Some Tax Problems in Making Gifts to or for Minors, 45 ILL.
BAR J. 320 (1957); Rogers, Some Practical Considerations in Gifts to
Minors, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 233 (1951); Tenney, Using the Custodian
Statute as a Planning Device, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 937 (1958).
332 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-501 (Reissue 1960); see Thomas v. First Nat'l
Bank, 112 Neb. 847, 201 N.W. 905 (1924) (judgment enforceable only
through county court administration and not by execution).
333 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1003(1) (Reissue 1960) (gift indefeasibly vests
title to the security or money in minor).
334 Weller v. Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899); see Miles v.
Miles, 120 Neb. 436, 233 N.W. 249 (1930) (after termination of trust,
property subject to claims of creditors which arose before termination);
Beals v. Croughwell, 140 Neb. 320, 299 N.W. 320 (1941) (provision that
beneficiary receive property only when solvent; held valid, and the
trust assets cannot be reached by creditors or trustee in bankruptcy).
Compare Lancaster County Bank v. Marshel, 130 Neb. 141, 264 N.W. 470(1936) (circumstances may establish intent to place assets beyond bene-
ficiary's creditors in absence of specific clause) with Flanagan v. Olderog,
118 Neb. 745, 226 N.W. 316 (1929) (language must be clear and un-
equivocal to create valid spendthrift trust).
335 See, e.g., 2 CAsNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1253 (3d ed. 1961): "The interest
of each beneficiary in the income or principal of a trust under this
instrument shall be free from the control or interference of any credi-
tor of a beneficiary or of any spouse of a married beneficiary and shall
not be subject to attachment or susceptible of anticipation or alienation.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall be construed as restricting
in any way the exercise of any power of appointment granted here-
under." A trust is necessary to impose a restraint on alienation in Ne-
braska, since a restraint on a legal vested fee simple estate is void.
Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W.2d 201 (1953), noted in 52 MICH.
L. REV. 616 (1954); cf. Fleming v. Blount, 202 Ark. 507, 151 S.W.2d 88(1941). See generally 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 26.13-26.47 (re-
straints on alienation of present legal fees simple or other absolute
interests), 26.48-26.51 (restraints on present legal life estates or terms
of years), 26.52-26.54 (Casner ed. 1952) (restraints on legal future
interests).
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I. INVESTMENT STANDARDS.
The investment powers of guardians and trustees are governed
by the conservative statutory standards of the "legal list. ' 336 The
statute provides, however, that a trust instrument may specify its
own investment rules. The practical effect of this is that a trustee
may be (and normally should be) given a virtually complete free-
dom of investment under a trust instrument. Even under an un-
limited investment power, a trustee would be subject to the exer-
cise of reasonable discretion.3 37
The custodianship statute contains language which permits
investment "as would a prudent man of discretion and intelligence
who is seeking a reasonable income and the preservation of his
capital."338 While this language probably implies no more than the
normal "prudent man" standard of fiduciary investment authority,
it is not clear whether the phrase "who is seeking a reasonable in-
come and the preservation of his capital" may limit somewhat the
scope for the exercise of prudence.3 39 At least, it is possible to
imagine some types of investments, which might be prudent and
desirable in some situations in connection With managing the
property of minors, but, because of the lack of income, could leave
a prudent custodian reasonably uncertain of his authority.
It also is not clear whether there is any subject matter limita-
tion on subsequent investments by a custodian. The statutes permit
only securities and money to be placed initially in the custodian-
ship.340 There is nothing in the investment powers which would
limit the subsequent authority of a custodian to only money and
securities.3 41 The definition of "custodial property" seems to create
a definite inference that the reinvested proceeds of a custodianship
need not be money or securities.342 From an investment standpoint,
336 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-601 (Supp. 1961).
337 2 SCOTT TRUSTS § 187.2 (2d ed. 1956): "[E]ven though the trustee is given
discretion in the making of investments, he commits a breach of trust
if he fails to use care and skill and caution in the choice of investments.
So also where the trustee has discretion whether to sell or retain land
or securities of the trust, he is guilty of an abuse of discretion if he acts
beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment." See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 227, comments u, v, and w (1959).
338 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(5) (Reissue 1960).
339 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 227 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 227-
227.15 (2d ed. 1956).
340 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1002(1), 38-1101 (Reissue 1960).
341 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1004(5) & (6) (Reissue 1960).
342 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1001(5) (Reissue 1960): "The custodial property
includes: (a) All securities and money under the supervision of the
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it is sound that the custodian's hands not be tied in advance to only
money or securities. Yet, if the statute is construed to permit the
custodian to deal in real estate or personal property other than
securities, the statutory framework creating custodianships seems
grossly insufficient.
All of these fiduciaries, however, are specifically permitted to
retain the securities originally placed in the arrangement, appar-
ently whether or not such retention is in fact reasonable. 343
J. LEASES.
A lease of a minor's property by a guardian for a period beyond
the term of the guardianship is voidable by the minor after attain-
ing majority.34  A trustee, however, may be authorized to execute
leases extending beyond the term of the trust.3 4 5 Special statutes
permit guardians and trustees to execute oil and gas leases and
pooling or unitization agreements 346 and easements for oil and gas
pipe lines34 7 beyond their terms upon an order of the district court.
K. TERMINATION AND SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY.
(1) Upon Attained Age.
Under the guardianship 348 and custodianship 349 statutes, a minor
is entitled to receive the entire property outright upon becoming
same custodian for the same minor as a consequence of a gift or gifts
made to the minor in a manner prescribed in sections 38-1001 to 38-1010;
(b) the income from the custodial property; and (c) the proceeds, im-
mediate and remote, from the sale, exchange, conversion, investment,
reinvestment or other disposition of such securities, money and income."
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(7) (Reissue 1960) which describes how
the custodian shall hold securities, money and "all other bustodial prop-
erty."
343 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-602 (Reissue 1956), 38-1004(5) (Reissue 1960).
344 Jackson v. O'Rorke, 71 Neb. 418, 422, 98 N.W. 1068, 1070 (1904): ' ith
reference to this right, it is well established that a guardian may lease
the ward's lands during the term of his guardianship, but that any
excess in such a lease beynnd such term will be void at the election of
the ward on coming of age."
345 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 189 (1959); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS 1409-
1418 (2d ed. 1956); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 978 (1959).
346 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-210 to 57-212.10 (Reissue 1960). See Merrill, The
Oil and Gas Lease-Major Problems, 41 NEB. L. REV. 488,- 492-94 (1962).
347 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-401, 57-402 (Reissue 1960).
348 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 38-101, 38-109 (Reissue 1960); In re Guardianship
of Phillips, 144 Neb. 183, 13 N.W.2d 99 (1944).
349 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(4) (Reissue 1960).
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twenty-one, or in the case of a guardianship, upon the marriage
of a female under twenty-one. A trust terminates at whatever
date or dates are specified in the trust instrument. This means
that only under a trust can a portion of the property be withheld
from the beneficiary to a more advanced age than twenty-one. It
is quite common in estate planning for a person to wish to with-
hold outright distribution beyond twenty-one for a variety of
reasons; among others, to permit the beneficiary to gain added
maturity and experience, to take over the property more gradually,
to acquire property as his needs develop (such as marriage, chil-
dren, or entry into business), or to serve as an incentive (such
as completion of a college education).
(2) By Death of the Minor.
Guardianships 350 and custodianships 351 are terminated by the
death of a minor, and the property passes to the minor's estate.
This presents a number of serious disadvantages:
(a) It is necessary to probate the estate of the minor, and sus-
tain added costs and delays.
(b) Since a minor cannot make a testamentary disposition, the
statute of descent defines the recipients of the property. The par-
ents, or surviving parent, are the beneficiaries of an unmarried,
childless minor, and receive one-half of the estate of a married,
childless minor.352 In many cases, the original transferor of the
property would prefer to specify the alternate takers for the pro-
perty in case the minor dies under age. Inheritance of the minor's
property may unnecessarily augment the parents' estates. This
may pass part or all of the property to a surviving spouse who is
an "in-law" of the original donor. And if the heirs of the deceased
minor are themselves minors, the property will be subjected to
new guardianships.
(c) The property will be subject to federal estate tax3 3 and
Nebraska inheritance tax.354
A trust can provide for a gift over to other persons on the
death of a minor. It may not be necessary to probate an estate for
the deceased minor. The successive beneficiaries following the
350 Barret v. Provincher, 39 Neb. 773, 58 N.W. 292 (1894) (after death of
ward, only administrator can commence or maintain suit).
351 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(4) (Reissue 1960).
352 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-101, 30-102 (Reissue 1956).
353 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
354 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2001 (Reissue 1958).
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death of the minor can receive property immediately upon the death
of the minor. The trust instrument, or some person acting under a
power of appointment, may specify the contingent taker or takers
on the death of the minor, and this may more precisely carry out
long range family objectives. A gift-over under the trust instru-
ment on the minor's death is not subject to the federal estate tax 3"5
or the Nebraska inheritance tax.356
L. OTHER.
The preceding sections have not attempted to exhaust the
differences between guardianships, custodianships and trusts. Spe-
cial situations may well call into focus meaningful distinctions not
considered in this paper. For example, ownership of securities of
a Subchapter S corporation by a trust, but not a custodianship or
guardianship, would terminate the Subchapter S election.357 There
are administrative matters which are not normally of prime im-
portance which might become significant in planning a specific
estate. A guardian or trustee,358 but not a custodian,359 may register
securities in the name of a nominee; a third party may not need
to consider the validity of the actions of a custodian or trustee,360
but is likely to deal with a guardian at his peril.361 Only a trust
permits voting rights to be split off from legal ownership of the
property, commingled investments, and a continuous management
of the property uninterrupted by death of the minor. A custodian-
ship may in some situations permit a quicker, easier and less ex-
pensive gift to minors, but this is primarily because non-profes-
sionals are more likely to be relied upon for fiduciary (or semi-
fiduciary) decisions, and in place of comprehensive legal advice,
in these situations. At this level of comparison, as at the others
discussed in this article, it is likely that trust planning will in
most cases offer the greatest number of significant estate planning
355 See, e.g., Hugh D. Rhodes, 41 B.T.A. 62, aff'd, 117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941).
356 County of Holt v. Gallagher, 156 Neb. 457, 56 N.W.2d 621 (1953).
357 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371(a) (2), 1372 (e) (3).
358 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-604 (Reissue 1956).
359 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1004(7) (Reissue 1960).
300 NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1006 (Reissue 1960) (custodianships). A similar
provision may be included in the trust instrument, and, although it
would not relieve from liability a third party who actually participated
in the breach of trust, it would lessen the notice and duty of inquiry
which might otherwise exist. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS §§ 296,
297 (1959).
301 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Richards, 57 Neb. 794, 78 N.W. 378 (1899).
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opportunities. Chief among these is that the trust is a flexible
product of legal draftmanship whereas guardianships and custodian-
ships are relatively impersonal statutory creatures.
III.
CONCLUSION.
Property management and estate planning for minors, like all
types of estate planning, is most effective when tailored to fit
individual needs and family objectives. The basic tools of an estate
planner for property management for minors are outright owner-
ship, guardianships, custodianships and trusts.
An analysis of the consequences of these property management
arrangements verifies with emphasis one of the fundamental estate
planning "rules of thumb" which becomes particularly applicable
where minor beneficiaries are involved: Never create an inheritable
future interest.36 2 There is nothing to be gained from a planning
standpoint in creating descendible future interests. Upon the death
of the named taker prior to the time at which the interest ripens
into unlimited ownership, additional expenses, and in many cases
additional taxes, will be incurred.
562 LEACH & LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 329, 402-3
(1961): "Never create a vested interest. Perhaps we should say, to be
more precise: Never create an inheritable interest-which includes, with
vested remainders, the so-called vested interest in a contingent re-
mainder or executory interest. The reason is that if the named taker
of a future interest dies before the interest vests in possession it is
bound to cause additional and unnecessary expense to have it pass
through his estate-administration expense always, and additional taxes
often .... As the cases in this section illustrate, the courts always at-
tempt to find that future interests are vested so the death of a beneficiary
prior to the time of distribution does not defeat his heirs, devisees and
legatees. While this approach to protection of the interests of the
deceased beneficiary may seem desirable in many cases, adverse con-
sequences also result. Vested interests which are descendable are
'owned' assets in the estate of the deceased beneficiary subject to federal
estate taxes and, generally, to state inheritance and estate taxes. Applied
to future interests these taxes are imposed upon an owner who never
has had the possession and enjoyment of the property, and they often
involve assets which are quite difficult to value. Further, the taxes can
be avoided entirely, while achieving the same result, by proper plan-
ning and drafting. We do not object to protection of issue and other
persons taking from a beneficiary who does not survive until the time
for distribution. But the proper method, which avoids unnecessary taxa-
tion, is by contingent interests with adequate substitute gifts, perhaps
utilizing special powers of appointment." See also id. at 23-25, 734.
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With respect to minors, the fundamental precept means:
First, minors should not receive outright ownership of sub-
stantial property during minority; and
Second, property interests should not normally vest in a minor
or his estate during minority.
From this, it follows that outright gifts, guardianships and
custodianships should ordinarily be avoided. These devices are
controlled almost exclusively by a statutory framework which will
probably not fit the intended disposition in a number of significant
particulars, and certainly not to the same degree as a carefully
drawn trust instrument. Even if the outright gift, guardianship or
custodianship would result in a desired family disposition of the
property, it is likely that where substantial property is involved,
a trust could achieve the same result more effectively.
It is not fair to conclude that outright gifts to minors, guardian-
ships and custodianships are never warranted in estate planning.
An outright gift of certain personal items, such as jewelry, clothing
and spending money,303 may properly be used for minors of a suf-
ficient age to understand the value of the items involved. In fact,
distribution of items of personal and household use of a decedent
which have a comparatively insignificant value for planning pur-
poses might advantageously be made by an executor to a parent,
relative or person having custody of the minor where the minor is
too young to take possession of the property himself .3 4 A testa-
mentary guardian should be nominated, and carefully chosen, to
provide for personal custody of the minor. Custodianships may
363 To the extent it may be socially desirable that minors should be per-
mitted, or encouraged, to learn financial management by utilization
of their own spending money, the statutes should be amended to clarify
that minors may have checking and savings accounts in commercial
banks. See note 29 supra.
3G4 Such a clause might relate to tangible personal property owned at death,
except business property and money and securities. After establishing
a method of division of the property, the clause would provide that the
executor may select the person to whom distribution is to be made for
the minor, and that person can determine the form in which the property
shall be held for the minor. See, e.g., 2 CASNER, EsTATs PLANWMG 1268
(3d ed. 1961): "Property and cash [the proceeds from the sale of any
described property] distributable to a minor under this Article FIRST
may be distributed by my executors to such minor personally, or to
such minor's legal guardian, or to some other person selected by my
executors to receive such property for such minor, and the receipt of
such minor, or such minor's legal guardian, or such other person, shall
be a complete discharge of my executors in regard to such distribution.
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be used for small investments in securities, preferably for short pe-
riods of time, even if not suited for a major estate planning role.365
This study also points up a major area for which immediate
legislative revision is needed. The statutes concerning the use of
guardianship funds are in reality legal anachronisms reflecting
colonial statutes arising from entirely different economic and
social considerations than exist today. Efficient guardianship ad-
ministration, as well as the need for accurately defining the legal
obligations of support owed to Nebraska minors for both Nebraska
law and federal tax purposes, requires a comprehensive revision
of these guardianship statutes.
The basic conclusion seems overwhelming that normally a
trust (or trusts) should be employed as the primary estate plan-
ning device with respect to property interests of minors. Where
substantial interests of minors in Nebraska property are involved
in estate planning, the most effective ownership and tax results
will be secured through careful trust draftsmanship.
The person to whom property is distributed under this Article FIRST
for the benefit of a minor shall decide from time to time whether such
property shall be retained for eventual distribution to the minor or
whether some or all of it shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale held
[and expended or invested?] for the minor. Such person's decision in
this regard shall be conclusive on all concerned." This clause has the
effect of creating an obviously unclear situation as to the relationships
of the executor and distributee toward the property and the minor, in
the interests of practicability and expediency in dealing with a com-
paratively insignificant portion of the over-all estate.
365 The usefulness of custodianships could be increased by broadening NEB.
REv. STAT. § 38-1002 (Reissue 1960) to permit distributions from a trust
to a custodian and payments by an insurance company to a custodian.
